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Summary
Summary
Human cooperative tendency is extraordinary. Humans extensively cooperate with
genetically unrelated individuals on an unprecedented scale. The focus of much
previous research has been to explain how particular cooperative investments fit
evolutionary theory; nevertheless new attention has been drawn to the remarkable
variation in human cooperation depending on the environmental context. In particular,
cities are frequently associated with reduced pro-social tendency. Fast-paced
urbanisation is currently a major cause of demographic change, meaning that it is
fundamental to understand how it affects human social behaviour. In this thesis, I
present experimental evidence on the effects of city living on cooperation from standard
economic games and from large-scale real-world measures. Chapter 3 describes the
effects of urban residence on generosity in a dictator game and on two self-report
measures of pro-social behaviours. City-living was not associated with self-reported
reduction in generosity and did not predict reduced donations in the dictator game nor
self-report scales. In Chapter 4, I used a trust game to test the idea that lower pro-
sociality in cities may be underpinned by lower trust levels. I found that city-dwellers
were less trusting than town-dwellers, but they were not less trustworthy. Finally, in
Chapter 5 I present results from a set of real-world experiments. I tested whether city-
dwellers were less pro-social than town-dwellers across four different forms of helping,
and whether urban-rural variation in pro-sociality was explained by diffusion of
responsibility or by perceived anonymity. I show that socio-economic factors, rather than
urbanicity per se, play an important role in shaping cooperative tendency. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction
Chapter 1
Introduction 
1.1 Human cooperative behaviour
Cooperative behaviour can be thought of as an investment in which an individual pays a
short-term cost while providing a benefit for another individual (Bshary & Bergmüller,
2008). The existence of costly help must be reconciled with the theory of evolution by
natural selection with its emphasis on self-interest (Darwin, 1859). Thus, the problem
facing evolutionary biologists is to explain how individuals that make short-term
cooperative investments are rewarded in terms of lifetime fitness. 
When cooperation is directed towards relatives, helping can result in passing shared
genes to the next generation, that is the cooperative investment can be repaid through
indirect fitness benefits (kin-selection; Hamilton, 1964a; b). However, humans
extensively cooperate with non-relatives, as well as with strangers that are unlikely to
ever meet again. Indeed, humans cooperative tendency spans from helping a stranger
in distress, to donating money for people starving in other countries, or donating blood.
This evidence challenges the idea of fitness maximising adaptations. 
Trivers (1971) suggested that direct reciprocity could make cooperative behaviours
between non-relatives beneficial. In particular, he argued that, when individuals are likely
to interact repeatedly, cooperative behaviour can be stable if it is conditional on a future
repayment. In other words, individuals help others to obtain their help in the future.
Nevertheless, humans often cooperate even in one-shot encounters, where there is no
14
Chapter 1. General Introduction
scope for direct reciprocity to occur (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Henrich, 2003; Henrich et
al., 2005). Under this scenario, indirect reciprocity can provide long-term benefits for
cooperation (Alexander, 1987; Boyd & Richerson, 1989; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998;
2005). Indirect reciprocity implies that individuals build a reputation based on their
cooperation tendencies with others. That is, individuals help others so that a third party
(i.e. a bystander) is more likely to help them the future. 
Even so, all these mechanisms do not explain cooperation with large groups of non-
relatives in situations where reputation gains are unlikely or absent. Punishment (Boyd
et al., 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002; Gintis, 2000; Henrich & Boyd, 2001) or social
learning and cultural evolution (i.e. social norms; Whiting & Whiting, 1975; Whiting,
1980) may provide a solution to this problem (but see e.g. André & Morin, 2011 for a
discussion on cultural altruism theories and shift of maladaptation from social cognition
to cultural transmission). In particular, experimental evidence suggests that reciprocal
cooperation is maintained with punishment (Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Raihani et al.,
2010) and avoidance. For example, shunning through partner switching, in which
individuals stop interacting with cheaters and choose a new interaction partner, is an
effective mechanism of cooperation enforcement (Bshary & Schaffer, 2002; Melis &
Semmann, 2010). 
In humans, punishment is an effective and common mechanism to maintain cooperation
(Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2010;
Gintis, 2000). Even third-party punishment can be seen in laboratory conditions (Fehr &
Fishbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In third-party punishment, a bystander
willingly pays a cost to punish an individual that is in violation of the cooperative norm,
even though the uncooperative act does not affect its own pay-off. It is not clear what
15
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benefit punishers gain in this instance, but it is likely that they are repaid through
reputation enhancement (Earley, 2010; Jordan et al., 2016) and the future possibility to
be chosen as interaction partner. 
Indeed, the possibility to build a reputation based on previous interactions is
fundamental to the evolution of human indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987), as well as
in controlling the emergence of free-riders in group-level mutual cooperation (i.e.
defectors in public goods scenario; Hardin, 1968). Experimental public goods games
have shown that groups usually start with high levels of cooperation, but these are hard
to maintain without the introduction of enforcement mechanisms such as punishment
and reputation (e.g. Hardin, 1968; Ostrom et al., 1999; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gächter et
al., 2010). Likewise, removing the possibility for social information exchange and gossip
(necessary to pass information on reputation), leads to a drop in cooperation levels
(Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Semmann et al., 2004; Sommerfeld et al., 2007).
Consequently, conditions that interfere with reputation building may hinder cooperation,
and these conditions are more likely found with large and unstable groups. 
Finally, it remains to consider cooperation towards strangers as a maladaptation (Boyd
& Richerson, 2002; Fehr & Henrich, 2003). If humans sociality has evolved in small and
stable groups, mainly formed of close relatives, and where interactions were never
anonymous, then, individuals were likely to be rewarded for helping others via indirect
fitness benefits (Hamilton, 1964a; b),  reciprocity (Trivers, 1971), or reputation (Nowak &
Sigmund, 1998). Nowadays then cooperation would be misplaced as we retain the
psychological mechanisms but we no longer benefit from helping close group-members.
Despite the logic of the argument, maladaptation is hardly accepted as an explanation,
mainly because humans show the capacity to recognise when it is beneficial to invest in
16
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an interaction, through kin-recognition, or by helping when observed or in repeated
interactions  (Fehr & Henrich, 2003;  Gächter et al., 2008; Raihani & Bshary, 2015).
Nevertheless, the argument, once again, raises the question of how humans adjust to
new environmental conditions, especially those where groups are large, unstable, and
anonymity, as well as the possibility of being exploited, are high. Such conditions are
common features of today's cities. 
1.2 Environment and cooperation
Changing environments present species with novel challenges and new selective
pressures, which ultimately affect survival, reproduction and fitness. Accordingly, these
changes can lead to behavioural modifications over time. Previous empirical research
showed that variation in cooperation levels may depend on the environmental context
(Bowles et al., 2003; Pepper & Nettle, 2017; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Silva & Mace, 2014).
One major environmental change, for both speed and extension, is urbanisation. It is
estimated that 54.7% of today's world population is lives in urban areas, compared to
33.8% in 1960, and with a projection up-to 65% by 2050 (UN DESA, 2015).
Understanding the impact of these rapid demographic changes and of the new city-
environment on our behaviour is of primary importance. 
Cities may hinder cooperation levels via the anonymity that dwellers experience, or via
the fast turnover and high homogeneity. These aspects could limit the possibility to
create strong connections with other dwellers, for reciprocity and for reputation building,
which are important aspects for the maintenance of cooperation in large groups
(Alexander, 1987; Hardin, 1968; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Moreover, cities are often
associated with higher deprivation levels and crime rates than towns (Pateman, 2011).
These factors promote distrust, antisocial behaviour, and unhealthy behaviours (Falk et
17
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al., 2015; Gardner & West, 2004; Mobley et al., 2006; Schroeder & Hoffman, 2014). 
The effects of deprivation on behaviour is explained by future discounting, for which
individuals prefer present rewards to delayed ones because, in harsh and unpredictable
environments, future rewards are less likely to be obtained (Frankenhuis et al., 2013;
Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Pepper & Nettle, 2017). In particular, living in severe
environments triggers a switch to a short life history strategy, leading to lower
investments in the long-term in health, in reproductive strategy, as well as in investment
in offspring (Frankenhuis et al., 2013). In cities, where deprivation and crime are often
higher than in towns, pro-social behaviours may be lower. 
1.2.1 Urbanisation and urbanicity
Urbanisation refers to the phenomenon of population growth living in cities, which leads
to the development of urban areas. It is a rapid demographic transformation from rural
world population that is rural to a predominantly urban one. Urbanicity, on the other
hand, refers to the presence of conditions characteristic of urban areas, such as high
population size and density, transportation networks, or pollution (UN DESA, 2015;
Vlahov & Galea, 2002). 
The United Nations' World Urbanization Prospects reported that 64.1% and 85.9% of the
developing and developed world respectively will be urbanised by 2050 (UN DESA,
2015). This unprecedented shift of population to urban areas is forecast to intensify in
the next few decades, creating cities of population sizes over 40 million people each.
Indeed, today many urban agglomerates (e.g. Mumbai, Delhi, Manila, Seoul, Beijing)
have already a population size of over 20 million people, with many others approaching
the same sizes. Urbanisation is often linked to modernisation and industrialisation,
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throughout human history. The major leap in technology in modern times, the Industrial
Revolution in the late 18th century, created new jobs which lead to a flow of immigration
to the urban areas, first in the north of England, then in Europe and North America. By
1900, 13% of the world's population had become urban. The leap to 50% in just over a
century, is also based on science and technology advancements, specifically,
improvements in medicine and prevention of diseases made city-living possible by
lowering mortality. 
The new scale and speed of urbanisation, though, is unprecedented. Nowadays,
urbanisation mostly consists of poor people migrating to cities. It is believed that First
World countries have mostly slowed down or arrested their urbanisation process, but in
poorer countries, this migratory trend is set to continue (UN DESA, 2015). Nevertheless,
this increase in migration in continents such as Asia and Africa might not translate into a
rise of wellbeing. Today, over 90% of the urban population of rural countries such as
Ethiopia and Uganda, live in slums.
1.2.1.1 The urban dilemma
Urbanisation is not always linked to wealth and wellbeing growth (Glaeser, 2011).
Today's world population growth is concentrated in marginal urban and sub-urban
contexts, especially slums. According to the UN-Habitat (https://unhabitat.org/), a third of
urban dwellers is living below the poverty line, and a minimum of 90% of slum dwellers
reside in the developing world. South Asia has the highest number of urban poor,
followed by East Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
almost 75% of urban dwellers currently live in slum conditions making urbanisation
almost indistinguishable from slum growth (UN DESA, 2015). It is generally believed that
uncontrolled rapid urbanisation is contributing to a rise in organised forms of urban
19
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violence (Muggah, 2014). Urban and metropolitan authorities often attribute urban
insecurity to the urban poor, and in particular to the failure of their integration. 
There are concerns about urbanisation, urban poverty and urban violence (Beall et al.,
2011; Farley, 1987; Muggah, 2014), especially on the scale and distribution of urban
growth as well as the character of urban impoverishment and inequality. Beall et al.
(2011) talk of a “fragile city” in which internal conflicts and violence are generally linked
to failed policies directed to providing security, growth and welfare in urban areas.
Nevertheless, there is growing understanding that the fragility of cities is not inevitable.
Policies should address a number of issues that seem to increase fragility (Muggah,
2014), such as: unregulated urbanisation, extremes of inequality, social disorganisation,
crime opportunity (Nazire et al., 2016; UN DESA, 2014; 2015). In particular, it is believed
that in North America specific neighbourhoods within a city may offer more intrinsic
opportunities for crime, and this is seen as a result of political neglect and local
economic decay. 
1.2.2 UK cities
UK cities are witnessing a population growth with a positive net immigration, as well as
an increase in the proportion of younger adults without children, accompanied by a
rising participation in higher education. This all seems to suggest a promising
demographic prospect for urban areas, especially for the larger cities (Parkinson et al.,
2006). Cities represent an important part of the UK in terms of population, economic
power, and employment. The cities' contribution to the overall national growth in England
has increased in recent years, and more cities contribute to the growth in jobs. 
As for the downside of urbanisation, it is recognised that crime is generally higher in
20
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cities. It also tends to be higher in larger cities than in smaller cities. Moreover, a
geographical pattern as described higher crime rates in the north and west than in the
south and east, although large variations between individual cities are present. Also,
deprivation is more widespread in cities than in towns, however, conditions are
improving in most cities, especially in some of the most deprived (Parkinson et al.,
2006). 
1.3 Urban-Rural variation in cooperation
There is a widespread view that city life is linked with lower cooperative tendency and
weaker inter-personal social ties than life in more rural settings. Early theorists predicted
that the probability of receiving help from a stranger would be inversely correlated with
population size (Wirth, 1938; Milgram, 1974) and subsequent studies provided empirical
support for these predictions (Korte, 1980; Amato, 1983; Steblay, 1987; Levine et al.,
1994; 2008). 
In his theoretical analysis of city life, Wirth (1938) describes behavioural consequences
of living in large, dense settlement of heterogeneous individuals, as creating impersonal
relations between strangers, as well as neighbours, friends, and family members.
Indeed, in his paper, Wirth argues that larger population size and density of settlements
lead to individual variability and anonymous relationships, diversification and
specialisation, whereas high heterogeneity leads to weakening of social structures,
higher mobility and rate of turnover, which in turn would create instability and insecurity.
In this scenario, institutions are oriented towards taking care of the collective rather than
individuals and individuals themselves tend to act through organised groups rather than
alone. Thus, demographic factors linked to urbanicity would inescapably translate into
lowered pro-sociality. 
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In contrast, Milgram (1974) looked at urban-rural differences in pro-social behaviour
from a psychological perspective and suggested that city-dwellers interact less with
others than town-dwellers as a response to the overwhelming environmental input and
stimuli of the urban environment (psychological overload theory). This psychological
overload occurs when the sensory inputs exceed the system's capacity of processing
them or using them effectively (Fukukura et al., 2013; Milgram, 1974; Sweller, 1988)
forcing it to prioritise some stimuli over others. For this, individuals might end up
overlooking the possibility to act pro-socially. An early test of this theory demonstrated
that after a high intensity sound and colour video, subjects had a significant increase in
social alienation-personal disorganisation scores as well as in cognitive-intellectual
impairment scores (Gottschalk et al., 1972). More recently, Misra & Stokols (2012)
showed that higher levels of perceived overload were positively correlated to self-reports
of higher stress rates and poorer health. According to Milgram (1974), city-dwellers are
more susceptible to psychological overload due to the high stimuli of the city
environment. Consequently, city-dwellers adapt their social behaviour to the urban
environment and, in results, relationships between friends and family are unvaried, but
contact between strangers is lowered if not absent. 
For the subcultural theory (Fisher, 1975), on the other hand, city-dwellers have less
contact with strangers than town-dwellers due to the higher heterogeneity and
diversification of subcultures within cities. Fisher proposed that, in cities, it is easier for
new behaviours to emerge and be adopted in different areas, and consequently
strangers are likely to be divided by these subcultures. Moreover, in cities turnover of
inhabitants is faster, and neighbours change more frequently than in towns (Bontje &
Latten, 2005; Burgess, 2008). This leads to a situation in which neighbours as well are
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often strangers, making it hard to create any ties. On the contrary, in small towns,
newcomers are encountered more frequently and are quickly recognised. All of these
factors may create an environment in which cooperative investments are discouraged in
cities. 
Despite this theoretical support for the view that city-dwellers are less cooperative than
town-dwellers, Gans (1962; 1967) proposed a model which actually predicted that city-
life has no impact on social behaviour. According to his idea, social interactions are
shaped and influenced by sociological factors characteristic to the individual, such as
age, socio-economic status, or ethnicity. These factors are independent of the external
environment and urbanicity levels. Moreover, Gans (1962) argues that factors such as
overload, population size and density, have no direct influence on individuals' social
behaviour. According to this model, there is no reason for expecting urban-rural
differences in social behaviour unless urban and rural populations have inherent
differences in social traits (e.g. if the urban population were mainly working class and
the rural mainly middle class). 
Following the theoretical models of urban social behaviour, empirical studies mainly
provided support for the view that city-life is deleterious for cooperation (Korte, 1978;
Steblay, 1987 for reviews). The strongest evidence of urban-rural differences in pro-
social behaviour is found in interactions between strangers. Individuals are less trusting,
helpful, and generally open to an exchange with unacquainted others. City-dwellers are
less likely to help others in a variety of contexts. For example, they are less likely to
complete and return postal surveys and interviews (Couper & Groves, 1996; House &
Wolf, 1978), to return a 'lost letter' (Kammann et al., 1979), to let a stranger use the
phone (Levine et al., 1976), less helpful when answering a 'wrong number call'
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(Kammann et al., 1979; Korte & Kerr, 1975; Milgram, 1974) or doing small favours
(Rushton, 1978). Moreover, in cities, clerks are found to be less likely to correct
accidental overpayments in shops (Korte & Kerr, 1975), and bank clerks are more likely
to double-check the amount of money given by customers (Lowin et al., 1971). Finally,
Takooshian et al. (1977) also found that city-dwellers are less helpful in assisting a lost
child. 
Nevertheless, these many empirical examples of differences between urban and rural
social behaviour are not uncontested. Indeed, few other studies have failed to replicate
these findings and to find a link between urbanicity and pro-sociality (e.g. Forbes &
Gromoll, 1971; Korte et al., 1975). Moreover, some studies even suggested that city-
dwellers are in fact more helpful than town-dwellers in some contexts. For example,
Hansson & Slade (1977) using a lost letter experiment found that, when the letters were
addressed to a deviant identity (i.e. “Friends of the Communist Party”), return rates were
higher in urban versus rural environments (Hansson & Slade, 1977). 
Taken together, results from a considerable number of experimental studies on urban-
rural variation in cooperative behaviour are suggestive that there is a decline in pro-
social tendency towards strangers with the increase in urbanicity levels. Nevertheless,
there is not and univocal consent. Moreover, more recent studies argued against this
idea by showing that human cooperative tendency can vary widely, even within a single
city (Nettle et al., 2011; Francey & Bergmuller, 2012). For example, Nettle et al. (2011)
found that, within a single city in the UK, socio-economic deprivation was negatively
associated with the tendency to cooperate in more anonymous situations (i.e. posting
lost letters, completing a survey, donating to a charity), whereas they found no effect of
deprivation in face-to-face interactions such as giving directions or making change. This
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would suggest that cooperation is lower in situations susceptible to the 'bystander effect'
(Darley & Latane, 1968). 
The 'bystander effect' (Darley, 1967; Latane & Darley, 1970) refers to the phenomenon
for which individuals refrain from helping someone in distress if other people are present
on the scene, and for which the likelihood of helping decreases with the increase in the
number of onlookers. Latane and Darley (1970) ascribed the bystander effect to the
perceived diffusion of responsibility (i.e. onlookers are less likely to intervene if there
other possible helpers) and to social influence, that takes place when individuals in
groups monitor the behaviour of other group members to determine how to act.
Interestingly, Plötner and colleagues (2015) found that also 5-year-old children helped
significantly more when alone compared to when other children (bystanders) were
present. In addition, they showed that children's likelihood to help was not reduced when
the bystanders were present but unable to help (i.e. behind a barrier). Thus, with their
study, they successfully showed not only that the bystander effect is present in children,
but also that it is due not to social influence but, rather, to a perceived diffusion of
responsibility (Plötner et al., 2015). A simple way to overcome the diffusion of
responsibility would be to directly ask for help to a single individual in the group, which
indeed grants higher help rates than indirect help requests (e.g. Flynn & Lake, 2008;
Goldman et al., 1983). Overall, if cooperation is lower in situations susceptible to the
bystander effect, it is possible that in cities – where the number of onlookers is often
higher than in towns – levels of cooperation are lower. Conversely, in situations where
an individual is directly approached for help, city-dwellers should be as likely as town-
dwellers to cooperate. 
Finally, in highly populated cities where the turnover of inhabitants is fast (Wirth, 1938;
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Milgram, 1974; Burgess, 2008), the day-to-day interactions that are more likely to take
place are one-shot interactions with strangers. Such a context leaves little scope for
reciprocity and for reputation gain associated with helping, as well as punishment of
antisocial behaviour (Milgram, 1974; Turner et al., 1987; Zimbardo, 1969). These are
major factors in promoting cooperation between unrelated individuals (Boyd &
Richerson, 1992; Melis & Semmann, 2010; West et al., 2007). This absence of known
observers (i.e. anonymity) found in cities may be a key-factor underpinning any variance
in cooperation levels. On one hand, Kerr (1999) argues that anonymity per se has little
impact on cooperation, but it assumes its negative aspect when the possibility of
reputation building and punishment is present. On the other hand, anonymity arises
when there is a lack of perceived personal value or when individuals are not personally
identified by others, and this state could lead to antisocial and aggressive behaviour
(Ellison et al., 1995; Reicher, 1984; Zimbardo, 1969). According to this anonymity theory,
in cities cooperation levels should be higher when individuals are in a group of
acquaintances rather than alone. 
Overall, this evidence, suggests that variation in cooperative tendency may be context
specific, with some situations promoting cooperation and others hindering it – rather
than suggesting an underlying behavioural disposition of city-dwellers. Identifying the
contexts that foster cooperation and understanding how specific features of city-life may
undermine cooperation can generate insight into our understanding of the extensive
variability of human cooperation.
1.4 Aims
Theoretical and experimental studies suggest reduced cooperation levels in cities
compared to towns. Nevertheless, the mechanisms by which the environment impacts
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on the sociality of individuals are poorly understood. With this project, I aimed at
empirically test theories for the reduction in cooperation of city-dwellers, and to
investigate the mechanisms underpinning variation in human cooperation. My key
questions were: 
1) Do urban-rural differences in cooperative tendency exist and, if so, are these
differences consistent across different contexts and forms of helping? 
2) Can urban-rural variation be explained by:
i. Variation in trust levels?
ii. Psychological overload and/or pace-of-life? 
iii. Bystander effect? 
iv. Perceived anonymity? 
1.5 Thesis outline
I begin describing the experimental and statistical methods used throughout the thesis in
Chapter 2. I move on to the first two experimental chapters of this thesis, in which I
present the results from the laboratory experiments: Chapter 3 explores the effects of
city-living on generosity in a dictator game and in self-report measures of cooperation,
and Chapter 4 tests the effects of city-living on trust and trustworthiness. In Chapter 5, I
present the results from large-scale field experiments: here I used four real-world help
measures to test the effects of city-living on helping and to determine what features of
city-life affect cooperative behaviour. Finally, in Chapter 6 I synthesise the findings of the
thesis and discuss its implications for human cooperation research and policy-making,
and I also suggest possible approaches for future research. 
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Chapter 2
 
Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
To investigate the effects of urbanicity on cooperation, I used a dual approach of
laboratory and real-world experiments. This was aimed at providing a comprehensive
insight into cooperative behaviour (Levitt & List, 2007). This chapter explains the
different methods utilised to best answer the specific questions, starting with the
laboratory experiments and proceeding with the field experiments. 
2.2 Laboratory experiments 
I used two standard economic games to analyse variation in cooperative behaviour
across urban scales. Participants were recruited using the online crowdsourcing
platform, Amazon Mechanical Turk (http://www.mturk.com; hereafter, AMT). Below I
briefly introduce what economic games are and describe the structure of the two games,
followed by a brief description and justification of online data collection methods. 
2.2.1 Economic games 
Economic games are contexts created in game theory to study decision making and
behaviour. They were introduced by Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) to analyse
situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that will influence their and
other individuals' benefit. Since then, economic games have found applicability in many
fields, mainly economics, politics, psychology, and biology (Hammerstein & Hagen,
2005). In biology, economic games are commonly adopted to investigate human
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cooperation and have been used to demonstrate how human choices can deviate from
rational decision making – individuals are willing to incur costs to themselves to  benefit
others instead of taking the choice which maximally benefits themselves (the payoff-
maximising choice). 
However, can these results be extrapolated to the real-world? Levitt & List (2007) argue
that the laboratory setting is characterized by particularities extraneous to the field, such
as the type of scrutiny or the self-selection of participants, who are assigned roles and
tasks exogenously, and that these peculiarities might compromise generalizability (see
also Gneezy et al., 2004; Hoffman et al., 1994). Moreover, the games played in
laboratory experiments are arguably reflective of real life situations (Levitt & List, 2007;
Raihani & Bshary, 2015). Nonetheless, these concerns have been addressed and a
growing number of studies validate the external validity of results in economic games
(Baran et al., 2010; Benz & Meier, 2008; Franzen & Pointner, 2012; Peysakhovich et al.,
2014; Stoop, 2014). In particular, Peysakhovich et al. (2014) found a strong positive
correlation between decisions in economic games, real-world help measures, and self-
report measures of cooperation among thousands individuals, providing considerable
support of the domain generality of human decision making in cooperative situations.
Consequently, I considered the use of economic games an appropriate method to
address my questions. Specifically, I used a dictator game and a trust game. 
2.2.1.1 Dictator game 
The dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986) is a two-player game in which one
participant plays the 'dictator' role and is endowed with a sum of money which they can
choose to distribute between themselves and a second participant (the 'receiver'). The
receiver has no active role in the game. This game is designed to assess how
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individuals respond to situations in which self-interest and equality are opposed. Despite
the fact that keeping all the money is the payoff-maximising strategy in this game, many
participants send some of the endowment to the receiver. A recent meta-analysis of over
100 dictator games showed that dictators on average donate 43% of their endowment
(Engel, 2011). Of all the participants, Engel found that only 36% kept all endowment,
16% split the endowment equally, and approximately 5% sent it all to the other player. 
The meta-analysis, reproduced and confirmed more recently by Zhang & Ortman (2012;
2014), also show high variation in decisions made by dictators, which documents how
demographics like age, gender, or country of residence shape behaviour in this game
(Engel, 2011). In particular, age has a strong effect on donations. Young people tend to
give less, whereas middle-aged people tend to split the endowment equally, and elderly
individuals tend to give everything. Also, gender affects donations, with females giving
significantly more than males. Based on this, I collected and included the demographic
information of workers in the analysis, in order to control for their effect on donation. 
2.2.1.2. Trust game 
The trust game (Berg et al., 1995) is a two-player game used to measure trust and
trustworthiness.  An investor is endowed with a sum of money and can choose to keep
the endowment or to trust the other player (the 'trustee'). If the investor chooses to trust,
the money sent is increased (often tripled) by the experimenter. The trustee then
decides whether to keep the money entrusted to him or to send any amount of it back to
the investor. This situation creates a social dilemma in which trustees would profit from
acting selfishly (i.e. keeping all the money entrusted to them), but if investors also
choose selfishness over cooperation, then both parties have a lower payoff. Based on
the standard assumption of self-interest, the prediction is that investors keep all of the
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money without incurring the risk of entrusting it to the other player, while trustees also
keep all the money eventually entrusted to them. Nevertheless, studies consistently
record willingness to trust on the part of the investor by sending part of their endowment
and willingness to return money entrusted to them on the part of the trustees (Johnson &
Mislin, 2011). On average investors sent 50% of their endowment, whereas trustees
sent back 35% of the amount received.  
Similarly to the dictator game, variation is high in both trust and trustworthiness
measures among studies in the trust game (Buchan et al., 2000; Johnson & Mislin,
2011). Results on the effects of age and gender in the trust game are discordant.
Student participants, which on average are younger than the random adult sample, are
found to be less trusting and trustworthy in some studies (Bellemare & Kröger, 2003;
Fehr et al., 2003), but not in others (Fehr & List, 2004). There is little support for gender
effects on trust (Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2003), however females are generally more
trustworthy than males (Bonein & Serra, 2009; Chaudhuri & Sbai, 2011; Croson &
Buchan, 1999). Therefore, I collected and included demographic information of workers
playing the trust game in the analysis, in order to control their effect on responses. 
2.2.2. Online labour markets
Online labour markets, such as AMT, connect employers with potential workers who are
paid to complete a short task on the computer. When conducting behavioural
experiments on online labour markets, the experimenter acts as the employer and hires
workers to be the participants in the experiment. 
The principal advantages of online labour markets are that they allow researchers to
recruit many participants quickly and relatively cheaply without affecting data quality
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(Amir & Rand, 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Ipeirotis, 2010; Mason & Suri, 2011;
Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), and they also allow access to a more demographically
diverse subject base than the traditional western undergraduate subject pool that is
often used in behavioural experiments (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2011).
The AMT sample has a good representativeness of demographic: it is older than the
average student sample but younger than the average adult sample (Berinsky et al.,
2012); there are significantly more females than males, although this trend is not limited
to the AMT sample but is also found in traditional and other web-based samples
(Gosling et al., 2004; Paolacci et al., 2010); and education level and racial composition
is similar to other adult samples (Berinsky et al., 2012). 
On the AMT platform, workers can browse a list of human intelligence tasks (HITs) and
choose whether to participate or not. In behavioural experiments, workers usually
receive a show-up fee for participating in the experiment and an additional payment
based on decisions made during the experiment. As economic games are often based
on interactions between participants, payoffs may also depend on the other participant’s
decisions. Nonetheless, participants do not need to be simultaneously present and to
have a real interaction. For experiments that do not require scaffolding of interactions, it
is common practice to use 'ex-post matching' of workers (Rand, 2012): after they have
all completed the task, workers are matched and payoffs are calculated a posteriori. 
Despite its popularity, issues concerning the reliability of AMT for behavioural studies
exist. Non-naïveté of participants and repeated participation are common concerns
(Chandler et al., 2013; Chandler et al., 2015; Rand, 2012). Non-naïveté seems
particularly relevant to studies conducted on AMT, as its workers have discussion boards
and communities where they can share information about HITs, as well as information
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about requesters. Moreover, workers can show preferences towards specific requesters,
which could lead to an over-representation of these workers. Both non-naïveté and
repeated participation may lead to an undesirable knowledge of the structure and
purpose of the experiment which has the potential to influence responses (Edlund et al.,
2009; Chandler et al., 2014). Fortunately, repeated participation is safeguarded by the
structure of AMT. Workers are identified by a unique 14-digit code (Worker ID) which is
used to prevent workers from submitting the same HIT multiple times. As for non-
naïveté, Chandler et al. (2014) showed that cross-talking may not be a strong issue as
workers tend to share information about the speed of payments mainly and only rarely
or inadvertently share information about specific passages of tasks. Furthermore, the
remarkable consistency of behavioural choices across tasks and especially over time
found by Peysakhovich et al. (2014) challenges the idea that non-naïveté affects
responses. 
Honesty of workers when reporting demographics has also been questioned (Suri et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, Rand (2012) used information gathered with workers' Internet
Protocol addresses and compared it with self-reported demographics to test their
truthfulness, and found reliability on self-report measures. Moreover, he found
consistency over time of reported demographics of the same workers. Other concerns
with AMT for behavioural studies focus on the situation in which workers complete the
tasks. As they are not in a controlled environment, it is possible that they are distracted
by other things happening in their surroundings, they might be working at the task with
someone else, they might be occupied in other things while working on AMT and not be
paying close attention to the task, and they could leave in the middle of the task (Crump
et al., 2013; Germine et al., 2012). A simple solution to control for most of these factors
is to include questions check granting the continuation of the tasks. Requiring workers to
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answer questions about the task they are about to start can help in preventing them to
complete the task when not fully present to it (Rand, 2012). Besides, reassurance
concerning the reliability of AMT for behavioural studies comes from the direct
replication of experiments in both the laboratory and on AMT (e.g. Horton et al., 2011;
Fagerlin et al., 2007; Suri & Watts, 2011; Peysakhovich et al., 2014). 
Based on this knowledge and following the general guidelines given by Mason & Suri
(2012), I used AMT to conduct the dictator game and the trust game. In particular,
workers interested in the HIT were given general instruction on the AMT platform where
they could find a password and a link to the game. I designed the experimental setup on
the web-based survey tool Opinio (https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk) and this included: 1) a
password request to access the game; 2) detailed instructions of the game; 3) two
comprehension questions to which workers had to answer correctly to have access to
the game; 4) an exit password at the end of the game that workers had to enter in the
AMT platform to be warranted the payment. This was done to ensure the completion of
the task by workers. 
2.3 Field Experiments 
All field experiments were conducted in cities and towns of the mainland United
Kingdom (hereafter UK), over July-September 2014, May-October 2015, and May-July
2016. In this section I briefly introduce the situation in urban and rural UK, I proceed with
presenting the study sites and their selection criteria, and I conclude explaining the
procedures used for the field experiments. 
2.3.1 Study sites
The UK population was estimated at 64.6 million in 2014, an increase of almost half a
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million people from 2013 and its highest value until then (Humby, 2016). Annual growth
rates between the 1990s and the 2000s increased from 0.28% to 0.64%. Looking in
more detail, population size, growth rates, and population density varied between
countries within the UK. Specifically, population density ranged from 69 people per
square kilometre in Scotland compared to 417 people per square kilometre in England
(Table 2.1). The population density of London alone was found to be more than 10 times
that of any other country (5,432 people per square kilometre; Humby, 2016).
Table 2.1: Regional variation in demographic variables. Population size and density
from 2014,  growth rate from 2004 to 2014.  Modified from Humby, 2016. Source: Office
for National Statistic. 
Despite the predominantly rural geography of the UK, at least 60% of the population
lives in urban areas (Pateman, 2011). Urban-rural differences in the UK are found in a
variety of sectors, such as job density, deprivation, crime rates, and health (Pateman,
2011; Prothero, 2016). For example, although there is no urban-rural difference in the
overall job density (based on how many vacancies are present divided per number of
residents of working age), urban areas seem to have more local authorities within with
the lowest (as well as highest) job density. Total weekly earnings are generally higher in
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 Region Population 2014 Population Growth Rate (%)
(millions) density 2014 2004-2014 
UK 64.6 266 0.75
England 54.3 417 0.79
Scotland 5.3 69 0.51
Wales 3.1 149 0.45
Northen Irland 1.8 136 0.71
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most rural areas and rural areas are less likely to be deprived (Pateman, 2011). Crime is
substantially higher in cities, which could be the result of the urban-rural differences in
income, population density, as well as of transportation and housing. 
Aware of these urban-rural differences, I carefully selected the areas within cities and
towns to carry out my experiments. Firstly, I defined cities as settlements of 100,000
inhabitants and over and towns as settlements of 20,000 inhabitants or less. This choice
was based on the literature of cooperation in urban/rural environments. For example,
Amato (1983) conducted experiments in 55 settlements in Australia and found a drop in
cooperation levels over the threshold of 20,000 inhabitants. This limit of 20,000 is the
lowest in the literature, consequently, I chose it for selecting towns in order to elicit and
detect variation in pro-social attitudes between cities and towns. Then I created a pre-
sample list of the 24 most populated cities in the UK (excluding London), ranked them
for population density, and selected the top six and bottom six. Towns were also chosen
on the basis of population size and density in the same manner. Moreover, their distance
from the cities selected was recorded to control for the effects of rural isolation on local
urbanism (Amato 1983). All information was obtained from the 2011 census data
(available at: www.ons.gov.uk). In this manner, I selected with 12 cities and 12 towns.
The mean population size (± se) of cities was 481,566.8 (± 63,918.3), whereas for towns
it was 14,966.5 (± 1,000.6). London was deliberately excluded from the study to avoid
incurring in different behavioural patterns from other cities which would have been
incomparable as London would represent the only global city (i.e. node of the global
economic system; Sassen, 2001) in the UK. 
All experiments were conducted in small areas (neighbourhoods) within cities and towns
to allow a focused control of demographic variables. Thus, supplementary data were
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collected on other aspects of urbanism at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods are
represented in the neighbourhood statistics as Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs),
which are the smallest areas for which census data are available. For each city, I
selected two neighbourhoods, one high-wealth and one low-wealth. To define wealth I
used the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). Deprivation is a multi-dimensional concept
that includes a range of domains such as employment, health, education, services or
crime (Townsend, 1987; Venkatapuram & Marmot, 2009). Likewise, the IMD is a
complex index consisting of multiple factors affecting deprivation of an area, to each of
which is given a percentage weighted value to the index. The principal factors of the
index are income and employment (Payne & Abel, 2012), which together count for
approximately 50% of the total weight on the IMD score (see section 2.3.1.1). Here,
high-wealth neighbourhoods were defined as having an IMD score in the upper quartile,
while low-wealth neighbourhoods had an IMD score in the lower quartile. Towns did not
have a comparable range of wealth within, thus it was not possible to choose a high-
and low-wealth neighbourhood in the same town. Towns were consequently selected on
the basis of their general IMD score, and then a neighbourhood was chosen within the
same upper or lower quartile scheme used for the selection of the neighbourhoods of
cities. In total, 36 neighbourhoods were selected, 18 of which were categorised as 'high-
wealth' and 18 as 'low-wealth'. Twenty-four of these neighbourhoods were in cities and
12 in towns. In addition, one experiment (i.e. the charity collection) was conducted in the
centre of each city and town. The same information on LSOA and IMD was gathered
and used in the analyses. 
2.3.1.1 LSOAs and IMD in England, Wales and Scotland
National statistics within the UK use different approaches to the neighbourhood statistic,
thus a note of caution is required. In 2004 England and Wales released their national
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statistics of LSOAs, designed to improve the reporting of small area statistics. In the
same year, Scotland released statistics for Data Zones (DZs), the equivalent of LSOAs
(available at: http://statistics.gov.scot/). DZs in Scotland have a smaller population size
than their LSOA counterparts in England and Wales. In particular, DZs have a minimum
population of 500 residents and a maximum of 1000, whereas LSOAs have a minimum
population size of 1000 and a maximum of 3000 residents. 
Moreover, England, Scotland, and Wales have each developed their own IMD (Payne &
Abel, 2012). Although the method used to develop the indices is similar (Noble et al.,
2006), the domains used, as well as the weight of each of these domains on the total
IMD, vary between countries (Table 2.2). However, income and employment are two
domains common to all national indices. Both are the heaviest weighted domains on the
indices and the weight is similar between countries (i.e. 45% in England, 56% in
Scotland, 47% in Wales). Moreover, removing the other domains from the IMD score
leaving only income and employment has been shown to have minimal effect on the
overall deprivation ranking (Adams & White, 2006). Finally, Payne & Abel (2012) showed
minimal differences between the English, Welsh and Scottish indices using an adjusted
IMD with national income and employment domains. 
With this in mind, I selected two adjacent Scottish DZs with similar neighbourhood
statistics (i.e. in the same IMD decile) to create an area of population size comparable
with LSOAs. If the ranking for income and employment differed between the two DZs, I
calculated and used the mean of their ranking value to extrapolate the decile in which to
categorize the new area. I used separate values of income and of employment deciles
or the national IMD decile in separate analyses to control if the two approaches held to
different results. All neighbourhood statistics used in the final analyses was based on the
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2015 census data. 
Table 2.2: Domains and domain weights for the 2010 national IMD of England,
Scotland, and Wales. Modified from Humby, 2016. Source: Office for National Statistic. 
2.3.2 Experimental Help Measures 
I used four help measures to examine cooperative tendency across urban scales:
making a donation to a charity, picking up a dropped item, stopping for a jaywalker, and
posting a lost letter. These measures are common in field studies of cooperation (e.g.
Amato, 1983; Levine et al., 1994; Milgram et al., 1965; Pearce & Amato, 1980; Silva &
Mace, 2014). In addition, I conducted direct observations to control for additional
community-level variables not captured by LSOAs census data. 
Charity collections required two experimenters; I was always in charge of the collection,
whereas a second experimenter was present to record information on the subjects. For
the dropped item and jaywalking measures only I conducted the experiments. In one
neighbourhood only, the lost letter experiment was conducted by a second investigator,
whereas two investigators helped me to conduct the direct observations. 
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Domain Weight
England Scotland Wales
Income 22.5% 28.0% 23.5%
Employment 22.5% 28.0% 23.5%
Health 13.5% 14.0% 14.0%
Education 13.5% 14.0% 14.0%
Access to services 9.3% 9.0% 10.0%
Housing 9.3% 2.0% 5.0%
Physical environment 0.0% 0.0% 5.0%
Crime 9.3% 5.0% 5.0%
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2.3.3 Procedures
2.3.3.1 Charity donation experiment
The charity collections were conducted once in n = 10 cities and in n = 9 towns in their
respective central area, between July – September 2014, May – October 2015, May –
July 2016. The charity chosen for this experiment was Doctors without Borders
(www.doctorswithoutborders.org/), an international charity that aims to bring medical and
humanitarian aid to populations affected by conflicts, epidemics, and natural disasters. It
was carefully chosen for not having any racial, religious, or political affiliation, and for
being international and not linked to any aspect more typical of either cities or towns.
Permission was granted by the charity and all money collected was deposited in the
London branch of Doctors without Borders. 
Charity collections took place in cities and towns centres, during weekday mornings,
between 09:00 and 13:00. During charity collections, I stood on the pavement with a
branded T-shirt and branded hand-held collection bucket. Every third suitable pedestrian
(i.e. over 18 and with no impediment to movement, such as disabilities, bags, old age)
was selected as a subject. 
I conducted three experimental treatments to measure variation in tendency to donate to
the charity: 
1) Direct request: subjects were approached when reaching a 3 metres distance,
presented with the collection bucket and asked if they wish to contribute with a donation
to the charity saying: “Hello, would you like to make a donation for Doctors without
Borders?”. 
2) Indirect request: I smiled and made eye-contact with the selected subject while
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holding the collection bucket in sight, but never directly asked for a donation. 
3) General request: I stood smiling silently on the sidewalk without approaching or
making eye contact to any potential subject. Every 30 seconds I would shake the
collection bucket and ask for donations saying: “Please, make a donation for Doctor
without Borders” without looking at anyone in the crowd.
I switched conditions every 15 minutes during the time of collection, with a maximum
total of four 15 minutes blocks for each of the three treatments per location. The second
experimenter stood at a minimum distance of 10 metres away from me and recorded the
number of people passing in front of me (using a clicker), the gender of the subject,
his/her estimated age, whether he/she contributed with a donation or not, if the subject
was alone or not, and the gender of whom he/she was with. For the general request
treatment, subjects were considered to be the individuals that contributed with a
donation. 
2.3.3.2 Dropped item experiment
This experiment was conducted in 36 neighbourhoods, both in the central and in the
residential area of each neighbourhood, between July – September 2014 and May –
October 2015. The procedure began with me walking with a handful of 20 cards on the
pavement. A pedestrian passing on the same side of the street was selected to be a
subject if they appeared to be 18 years or older, was not carrying bags, and had no
physical handicap. When the subject was approximately 5 metres away, I dropped the
cards onto the pavement, bent down, and began picking them up one at a time. 
I conducted two experimental treatments to measure variation in tendency to help pick
up the dropped items: 
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1) Direct request: after dropping the cards, I bent down to retrieve the cards and also
looked at the subject and asked: “Could you help me, please?”.
2) Indirect request: after dropping the cards, I bent down to retrieve the cards and
looked at the subject, but never directly asked for help.
After picking up the envelopes, I recorded gender and estimated age of the subject,
whether he/she stopped to pick up any cards, if the subject was alone, and the gender
of whom he/she was with. 
2.3.3.3 Lost letter experiment
Stamped letters addressed by hand to a PO box address were dropped in the 36
neighbourhoods between July – September 2014 and May – October 2015. The
addressee's name was made neutral by including only the initial of the name (Holland et
al., 2012), which consequently could have been male or female (i.e. E. Zwirner). To test
the effect of a direct versus indirect help request, half of the letters were dropped on the
pavement with the address facing up on rain and wind free mornings, whereas the
others were left on cars’ windscreens with a post-it saying: “Could you post this for me
please? Thank you”. 
The letter drop points in the neighbourhood were randomly determined using Google
Maps (www.google.com/maps) and were never on the same street or where a post-box
was visible. I used the return rates of the letters from the two treatments to measure the
neighbourhood levels of cooperation. 
The number of post-boxes in the neighbourhood was counted using data from
Somerville (http://dracos.co.uk/made/nearest-postbox/) and Local Postbox
(www.localpostbox.co.uk/) and controlled for in the analysis because the number of
letters posted is likely to be higher in neighbourhoods with more post-boxes. I also
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controlled for the possibility that litter in the environment may be responsible for a lower
return rate (letters may be overlooked as litter) by conducting a minimum of four
transects per each neighbourhood (mean ± sd = 5.11 ± 0.71). Transects were 100
metres long. I recorded the number of visible litter and used the mean number of litter
pieces per neighbourhood as control variable in the analysis. 
2.3.3.4 Jaywalking experiment
This experiment was conducted in 26 neighbourhoods, both in the central and in the
residential area of each neighbourhood, between July – September 2014. The
procedure began with me standing on the sidewalk. An approaching car was selected if
its speed seemed inside the speed limits and if no other car behind it was present.
When the selected car was approximately 10 meters away, I started to cross the road. If
the car slowed down/stopped I continued to cross the road, if it did not, I stepped back
on the sidewalk. After the attempt to cross the road, I recorded whether the car stopped
to let me cross the road, whether the driver was alone, and their gender and estimated
age. 
2.3.3.5 Direct observations
For the psychological overload hypothesis (Milgram, 1974) urban-rural variation in pro-
social tendency is primarily underpinned by the excessive levels of social and
environmental stimuli present in cities but not in towns. Therefore, other measures not
captured in the neighbourhood statistics were collected at each testing site for control.
Direct observations were carried out between July –  September 2014 and between May
– November 2015. Particularly, in each neighbourhood, I conducted eight sample
intervals of 15 minutes on weekdays as follows: 8:30-9:00 and 13:00-13:30 on main
roads; 10:30-11:00 and 17:00-17:30 on residential roads. I used both main and
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residential roads to control for the possibility that individuals are more often walking
alone in residential roads rather than in central roads. 
During these observations, the sampling included the following information: 
i) the number of people observed,
ii) their gender,
iii) their estimated age,
iv) whether they were in groups and the number of people per social group (i.e.
individuals walking together),
v) walking speed (seconds/metre) by marking a 10 metres zone on the sidewalk,
vi) number of cars passing a pre-established line on the street.  
2.4 Statistical analyses 
Data were analysed using R version 3.1.2 (R Core Team, 2015). As a general rule, I
used a model averaging approach (as described in Grueber et al., 2011), in which
multiple models representing multiple hypotheses are examined and ranked. Therefore,
rather than testing a null hypothesis, I calculated quantitative measures of support for
each of the hypothesis tested (Anderson & Burnham, 2002). Models were compared
between one another using Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1976) corrected
for small sample sizes (AICc; Hurvich & Tsai, 1993). A subset of top-models was created
by taking the best model (lowest AICc) and any models within two-AICc units from it.
From the subset of models, the relative importance of each term in the models was
estimated by summing the Aikake's weights of all models where that term is present.
Aikake's weights represent the probability of one model to be the true model compared
to the others; consequently, relative importance can be seen as the probability of the
term in consideration to be a real component of the best model (Anderson & Burnham,
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2002; Symonds & Moussalli, 2011). 
In my analyses, I firstly created a global model which included all explanatory terms of
interest. I then centred (by subtracting the mean) and standardized (by dividing by two
standard deviations) the input variables to allow averaging over models that include
different interaction terms (Grueber et al., 2011) and relative strength of parameter
estimates to be interpreted (Gelman, 2008), respectively. I used the R package MuMIn
(Barton, 2013) to determine the sub-models which are then compared using the AICc
value and the package AICcmodavg (Mazerolle, 2011) to estimate confidence intervals.
Finally, I computed the estimates and relative importance of each parameter present in
the top-models (models within two-AICc units from the best model). In the result
sections of the experimental chapters, I reported the parameter estimates of the top-
models.  
2.5 Ethical statement
All methods for the laboratory experiments were approved by the University College
London Research Ethics Committee (project number 3720/001). Before taking part in
the experiment, participants were provided with detailed written instructions, and were
informed that participation was voluntary and that they could leave the game at any
moment. Debrief emails were sent after the completion of the trust game experiment to
acknowledge the simulated counterpart. All methods for the field experiments did not
require specific ethical approval through the University College London Research Ethics
Committee as the research only involved anonymised records and data sets publicly
available (UK Census Data) and non-invasive, anonymous studies of public behaviour. 
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Chapter 3
Urban residence effects on generosity 
in a dictator game and in self-report scales
3.1 Abstract
With over half of the world's population living in cities, it is of primary importance to
understand how city life influences our behaviour. Several field studies have reported
lower cooperative tendency of city-dwellers compared to rural-dwellers in a range of
contexts. I used a dictator game in combination with two self-report measures of
cooperative behaviour to investigate how population size of place of residence affects
pro-sociality, as well as to assess whether behaviour in a common economic game
correlates with self-reported measures of cooperative behaviour in the real world.
Results indicated a correlation between dictator donations and the self-reported
Interpersonal Generosity Scale, but showed no evidence of urban-rural variation in
generosity in either the dictator game or the self-report scales. Based on these results
and the contrasting evidence from previous field studies, this study suggests caution
when generalising behaviours from one context to another. 
3.2 Introduction 
Cooperative behaviours are widespread in nature, from the eusocial insects to cleaner
fish and cooperative breeding vertebrates (Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Heg et al., 2005;
Jennions & Macdonald, 1994; Koenig & Dickinson, 2004; Wilson & H olldobler, 2005).
Nevertheless, human cooperation reaches unique levels, extending to a variety of forms,
involving large groups of unrelated individuals, and showing an extraordinary plasticity.
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This plasticity is shaped by variation in the environmental conditions in which individuals
find themselves (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; West et al., 2007). 
One environmental context that seems to trigger variation in cooperative levels in
humans is urbanicity, via the high population density associated with it (Amato, 1983;
Milgram, 1974; Korte, 1980). Various studies have shown that, compared with rural-
dwellers, city-dwellers are less willing to assist strangers in distress, to help a 'lost'
tourist, to post a 'lost letter', or to donate to charities (Levine et al., 1994; Levine et al.,
2008). Furthermore, city-dwellers adopt different strategies to town-dwellers in
experimental economic games. Bahry & Wilson (2006) conduced an ultimatum game in
urban and rural areas of Russia and found that rural-dwellers are more likely to reject
low offers and to accept high ones than their urban counterparts. The latter were more
likely to employ a “hyper-fair” strategy, thus rejecting offers that are too low and too high.
A common approach to studying the factors affecting human cooperation is to use
economic games in online labor markets, which allow many participants from different
backgrounds and different locations to be recruited (Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci et al.,
2010; Rand, 2012). A simple economic game often used is the dictator game
(Kahneman et al., 1986), which was designed to assess how individuals respond to
situations in which self-interest and equality are opposed. In this two-player game, one
participant plays in the 'dictator' role and is endowed a sum of money which they can
choose how to distribute between themselves and a second participant (the 'receiver').
The receiver has no active role in the game. Dictators are expected to keep all the
endowment to maximise their income; nevertheless, multiple studies show that dictators
tend to deviate from the income-maximising strategy of keeping the whole endowment,
and average donations were found to reach 28% in a meta-analysis (Engel, 2011;
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Zhang & Ortmann, 2013). 
In spite of the widely accepted conclusions drawn from studies employing the dictator
game that dictators act pro-socially (by deviating from the income-maximising strategy),
experimental evidence of the real-world validity of results from economic games is still
debated (Bardsley, 2005; Benz & Meier, 2008; Franzen & Pointer, 2013; Levitt & List,
2007; Stoop, 2014). One way of controlling whether donations in a dictator game are
representative of participants' generosity in real-world situations is to employ self-report
scales of cooperative behaviours (Peysakhovic et al., 2014; Rushton et al., 1981). Self-
report scales, widely used in personality studies, are designed to measure the degree to
which individuals are willing to incur personal costs to enhance the well-being of others
(Peysakhovic et al., 2014; Rushton et al., 1981; Smith & Hill, 2009). In particular,
Peysakhovich et al. (2014) found consistency between results in a dictator game and
self-report measures of cooperation, as well as consistency in results over time. 
In this experiment, I examined the effects of urbanicity on generosity in a dictator game
and in self-report scales. Consistent with other studies, I used donation in the dictator
game as a proxy for generosity and, based on the literature, I predicted that city-dwellers
would be less generous than town-dwellers. To control whether donations in the dictator
game were representative of participants' generosity in real-world situations, I used two
self-report scales of cooperative tendencies and matched responses from the dictator
game and the self-report scales. The scales reflected the levels of pro-sociality by
asking to rate statements about self-perceived generosity (Rushton et al., 1981) or
statements on the frequency in which one engages in prosocial activities (Smith & Hill,
2009). I predicted that results from the dictator game and scores from the self-report
measures would be correlated, with city-dwellers reporting less real-world cooperative
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acts than town-dwellers. 
3.3 Methods 
Data were collected during May and June 2014. All workers were recruited via the online
labour market AMT. Workers were informed that they would participate in an online
experiment and that they could earn money. For this study data were collected in two
parts, separated by an interval of 14 days. This time separation between the two parts
was used to avoid any priming effects. In the first part, 621 workers were randomly
assigned to play a dictator game (n = 310) or to complete a survey (n = 311). After two
weeks, the same workers were contacted to participate in the alternative task. Of the
initial 621 workers, only 356 returned for the second part (i.e. the dictator game, n = 171;
survey, n = 185). Overall, n = 210 workers in the dictator role submitted complete
responses and n = 496 workers submitted complete responses to the surveys.  A total of
n = 169 workers completed both tasks. 
3.3.1 Dictator game 
Workers in the dictator game received written instructions about the game (see
Appendix I for full instructions) and were required to answer two comprehension
questions correctly to participate. They were informed of their role in the game as 'Player
1' (the dictator) or 'Player 2' (the receiver) and that their worker ID would remain
anonymous to the other worker. Workers received $0.20 for participation in the game,
regardless of their role. Dictators received an extra $1 and they were asked to choose
how much of this endowment they wanted to send to the other worker (from $0.00 to
$1.00, in $0.10 increments). After making their decisions, all workers were asked to
provide their age, gender, approximate annual income and place of residence. Only data
from workers in the dictator role were analysed. I used 2010 census data (US Census
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Bureau) to retrieve information on population size of each location. 
3.3.2 Survey 
Workers in the survey answered a total of 25 questions. For completing this task,
workers received $0.60. Surveys were composed of two self-assessment Likert-type
scales to measure helping behaviour in real-world settings (Appendix I). I used two
separate scales that rely on different types of memory (episodic and semantic) (Adams
et al., 1999; Robinson & Clore, 2002), to limit the influence of “memory bias” - for which
individuals tend to overestimate the frequency of favour exchange when giving (Smith &
Hill, 2009). “Memory bias” involves recalling of events from episodic memory, thus its
influence, if present, should be stronger in one scale (i.e. the one that relies on episodic
memory) than the other. 
In particular, workers completed an Interpersonal Generosity Scale (IGS, 6 questions)
(Smith & Hill, 2009) and a Self-Reported Altruism scale (SRA, 19 questions) (Rushton et
al., 1981). These scales reflect the worker's levels of pro-sociality. The IGS scale asks
workers to rate how strongly they agree with statements about themselves and their
perceived generosity (i.e. “My decisions are often based on concerns for the welfare of
others”; from 0 = ”I don't agree at all” to 6 = ”Strongly agree”) and relies on semantic
memory, whereas the SRA scale asks how often the worker engages in prosocial
activities (i.e. “I have done volunteer work for a charity”; from 1 = ”Never” to 5 =
”Always”) and relies on episodic memory. Scores of the self-reported scales were
calculated by adding responses (Likert, 1932; Boone & Boone, 2012). Scores ranged
between 6 – 36 for the IGS scale and between 5 – 95 for the SRA scale. These were
treated as continuous variables for the analyses. A Pearson's correlation was run to
determine the relationship between the two scales' scores. 
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Due to the high frequency of $0.00 and $0.50 cents donations, I reduced dictator
donation to a 3-level ordinal variable (1 = gave $0.00, 2 = gave between $0.10 and
$0.40, and 3 = gave $0.50 or more). Of the 239 workers that specified gender, 78 were
females and 161 were males. Age ranged between 18 and over 65 in age (Table 3.1).
Approximate annual income ranged from less than $12.500 to over $100.000. For the
analyses, age and income were divided in 3-level and 6-level variables, respectively
(Table 3.1). I used the demographics of current residence to test the effects of city-living
on dictator donations and Likert-type scale scores. Models and results presented here
use the log of population size of current residence. 
Table 3.1. Information on factor levels and sample sizes for the explanatory terms used
in the statistical models. 
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Variable Class
Age 0: 18-24 1: 25-34 2: 35< Total
66 121 52 239
Gender 0: Male 1: Female NA Total
161 78 2 241
Income 0: <$12.500 1: <$25.000 3: <$37.500 4: <$50.000 5: <$65.000 6: >$65.000 Total
52 40 46 30 31 37 236
Donation 0: $0.00 1: $0.10-$0.40 2: $0.50 and over Total
114 45 82 241
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3.3.3 Analysis 
3.3.3.1 Were dictator donations predicted by population size of current residence
a n d s e l f - r e p o r t e d c o o p e r a t i o n m e a s u r e s ?
I tested whether generosity in the dictator game was predicted by population size of
current residence and self-reported generosity while controlling for age, gender and
income variables. I created a cumulative link model (CLM) with amount sent as
response term (3-level ordinal: 1 = gave $0.00; 2 = gave between $0.10 and $0.40; 3 =
gave $0.50 or more) and the following explanatory terms: population size of current
residence (continuous), dictator's gender (0 = male; 1 = female), age (3-level ordinal)
and annual income (6-level ordinal), and whether the dictator played the game in the
first or second wave of the experiment (0 = first wave; 1 = second wave) (Table 3.1). The
number of observations for this model was n = 206.  
To test whether IGS or SRA scales predicted donations in the dictator game, I created a
CLM with amount sent (3-level ordinal) as response variable, and IGS score
(continuous), SRA scale score (continuous), and whether the worker took the survey in
the first or second wave of the experiment (0 = first wave; 1 = second wave) as
explanatory terms. Number of observations for this model = 169. 
3.3.3.2 Did self-reported cooperation measures vary across urban scales? 
To test whether scores from self-report measures of social behaviour differed between
cities and towns, I created two linear models (LMs) with IGS and SRA scale scores as
continuous response variables, respectively. Explanatory terms for the global models
were: population size of current residence (continuous variable), gender (0 = male; 1 =
female), age and annual income (categorical), and whether the worker took the survey
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in the first or second wave of the experiment (0 = first wave; 1 = second wave) (Table 1).
The number of observations for these models was n = 150. 
3.4 Results 
Dictator donations ranged between $0.00 and $1.00, nevertheless higher frequencies
were recorded for the $0.00 and $0.50 cents donations and the most common response
was to keep all the endowment (Figure 3.1). Population size of residence ranged from
367 to more than 8 million (mean ± se = 714,200 ± 161,095). No significant relationship
was found between current residence and age or income. 
Figure 3.1. Histogram of the amount sent (donations). The most common response was
to send $0.00, followed by the equal split of the endowment (sending $0.50). 
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There was a moderate positive correlation between scores from the IGS and from the
SRA scale (Pearson's r = 0.43, n = 461, p < 0.001). The mean SRA scale score (mean ±
se = 50.2 ± 0.58) was significantly higher than the mean IGS (mean ± se = 25.08 ± 0.25;
Paired t-test: t = 47.5, df = 461, p < 0.001). 
3.4.1 Were dictator donations predicted by population size of current residence
and self-reported cooperation measures?
I found five models which were within the 2AICc units of the best model when testing the
effects of population size on dictator donations (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2. Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on dictator donations. Age: age of
Dictator; Gender: gender of Dictator; Income: approximate income; Wave: wave in which
the Dictator Game was played. 
Gender was a component of all five top models and had a significant negative effect on
donations (effect size = -0.31; CI: -0.57, -0.05). Male workers were less generous than
female workers (Figure 3.2). 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Age + Gender 4 422.19
2 Gender 3 422.27
3 Age + Gender + Wave 5 423.06
4 Gender + Wave 4 423.85
5 Age + Gender + Income 5 424.12
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Table 3.3. Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 3.2. 
Figure 3.2. Donation categories per gender of worker. Male workers were significantly
less generous than female workers. 
Age and income of worker, as well as wave in which the dictator game was played were
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Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Age 0.21 0.14 (-0.16, 0.42)
Gender -0.31 0.13 (-0.57, -0.05)
Wave -0.13 0.14 (-0.24, 0.15)
Income -0.05 0.13 (-0.10, 0.09)
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all component variables of the top models, although confidence intervals spanned zero
suggesting that they were not likely to affect donations (Table 3.3). 
Testing whether IGS or SRA scale scores were correlated with dictator donations, I
found 3 top models, and IGS was a component of all the top models (effect size = 0.34;
CI: 0.02, 0.66; Table 3.4). Dictator donations were positively correlated with IGS scores.
SRA scores and the wave in which the dictator game was played were both components
of the top models. Nevertheless, all of the confidence intervals spanned zero (Table 3.5).
Table 3.4. Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of scale scores on dictator donations. IGS: IGS
scores; SRA: SRA scale scores; Wave: wave in which the Dictator Game was played.
Table 3.5. Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 3.4. 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 IGS 3 346.32
2 IGS + SRA 4 347.66
3 IGS + Wave 4 348.04
Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
IGS 0.34 0.16 (0.02, 0.66)
SRA -0.15 0.17 (-0.25, 0.18)
Wave -0.18 0.3 (-0.35, 0.27)
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3.4.2 Did self-reported cooperation measures vary across urban scales? 
For the IGS scores, gender was a component of the two top models (effect size = -2.38;
CI: -4.16, -0.60; Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6. Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on IGS scores. Age: age of worker;
Gender: gender of worker; Population: population size of worker's residence. 
Male workers scored lower than female workers in this self-report measure (Figure 3.3).
The other component of the top models were age and population size of current
residence. Nevertheless, confidence intervals for these component spanned zero (Table
3.7). 
Table 3.7. Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 3.6.
Components of the top models for the SRA scale (Table 3.8) were age, gender and
population size. Confidence intervals spanned zero for all components (Table 3.9). 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Age 3 1152.31
2 Gender 3 1152.47
3 Gender + Population 4 1152.87
Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Age -2.18 1.84 (-3.92, 2.57)
Gender -1.48 0.95 (-1.41, -0.58)
Population -0.65 0.96 (-1.04, 0.81)
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Figure 3.3. Relationship between IGS scores and gender of worker. Female workers
scored significantly higher than male workers. 
Table 3.8. Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on SRA scale scores. Age: age of
worker; Gender: gender of worker; Population: population size of worker's residence. 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Age  3 1151.31
2 Population 3 1152.47
3 Gender 3 1152.87
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Table 3.9. Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 3.8.
3.5 Discussion 
This study investigated the possibility that urbanicity influences generosity in dictator
games and in self-report measures of cooperation. The second aim was to test whether
self-reported measures of cooperation reflect how individuals behave in an economic
game. In contrast to my predictions, population size did not predict generosity in the
dictator game nor scores of self-reported measures of cooperative behaviour. City-
dwellers did not behave significantly less generously than town-dwellers in the dictator
game, and scores from the two Likert scales measuring helping behaviour in real-world
settings did not differ across urban scales. Therefore this study does not match results
from field studies reporting urban-rural variation in cooperative behaviour (Amato, 1983;
Levine et al., 1994; Levine et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, results show a positive correlation between self-report measures of
cooperative behaviour and donations in a dictator game. In particular, the IGS scores
reflected dictator choice, with people who scored lower being less likely to donate part of
their endowment. This finding is similar to those of a recent paper by Peysakhovich et al.
(2014). In their study, they collected decisions in different economic games and answers
to 35 self-report questions regarding cooperation and punishment in real-world settings
for over 500 participants. In this way, they found a strong positive correlation between
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Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Age -0.54 1.31 (-3.59, 6.21)
Gender 0.09 0.76 (-1.41, 1.59)
Population -0.12 0.47 (-1.04, 0.82)
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the decisions made in economic games and the self-report measures of moral values,
but not self-reported behaviours (Peysakhovich et al., 2014). They argue that this might
be due to an inaccuracy of self-reporting of socially desirable behaviours. 
Here I have not found any correlation between donations and the SRA scale, which asks
how frequently prosocial behaviours are performed (Rushton et al., 1981), but I found a
correlation between donations and the IGS scale, in which workers are asked to rate
how much they agree with statements about themselves and how others see them. The
type of questions presented in the two scales is intrinsically different as they relate to
episodic and semantic memory, respectively. Episodic memory represents memory of
experiences and specific events, and has a rapid decay (Adams et al., 1999; Robinson
& Clore, 2002). Semantic memory, on the other hand, refers to general factual
knowledge, does not decay rapidly, and is independent of personal and temporal context
(Robinson & Clore, 2002). Thus “memory biases” that lead to over-/under-estimating
generosity when in the giving or receiving part of the exchange, respectively (Smith &
Hill, 2009), are more likely to occur when recalling events in our episodic memory, rather
than recalling generalized knowledge from our semantic memory. The IGS scale may
leave little scope for over-reporting being altruistic, and this would explain the correlation
found between IGS scale measures and dictator choice. 
It is not clear why I did not find urban-rural variation in generosity in the dictator game or
the self- report scales in this study. It is possible that these measures are not
representative of behaviour in real-world settings. Despite the growing evidence of the
real-world validity of results from laboratory games (Benz & Meier, 2008; Peysakhovich
et al., 2014; Franzen & Pointner, 2013; Stoop, 2014), many psychology studies argue
60
Chapter 3. Urban residence effects on generosity
that the correlation between behaviour in two separate situations may be low if the
behaviour is mainly influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits (Benz
& Meier, 2008; Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Thus, results from laboratory settings would be
representative of real-world behaviours in similar situations. Pro-social tendency
recorded in field studies in situations spanning from posting a 'lost letter' to helping a
stranger in distress (Amato, 1983; Levine et al., 2008; Silva & Mace, 2014), have
arguably little connection with donating in a dictator game. 
Moreover, urban-rural variation in cooperative tendency may be primarily elicited by the
“bystander effect”, which refers to the phenomenon where help is less likely to be
offered to an individual in need as the number of onlookers increases (Darley & Latane,
1968). In cities, where the number of onlookers is often higher than in towns, dwellers
are possibly less likely to help (Darley & Latane, 1968). On the other hand, the dictator
game, where workers are individually asked to participate, may not be susceptible to the
“bystander effect”. This might explain why no urban-rural variation was found in this
context. 
Self-report measures, by contrast, are aimed at distinguishing between individual
preferences and personalities in a variety of situations (Rushton et al., 1981; Carlo et al.,
2003). From this perspective, the lack of correlation between scores from the scales
used and population size in this study is maybe more puzzling than for dictator
donations and population size. Moreover, IGS scores and dictator donations were
positively correlated. Based on these results and the contrasting evidence from previous
field studies, it is likely that results in a dictator game and the self-report scales are
arguably representative of behaviour in the field. 
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Another potential limitation is that these results were obtained using AMT, rather than in
a real-world setting. It has been suggested the online environment might produce
markedly different results to those that would be obtained under more traditional lab-
based settings (Crump et al., 2013; Gosling et al., 2004). This effect could be more
marked if the behaviour in question is contextually evoked (Benz & Meier, 2008). In
particular, if the lower pro-sociality of city-dwellers is elicited by the physical environment
in which they live in, the online setting of the game would be inappropriate to measure
any behavioural difference between city- and town-dwellers. A possible solution is to
employ lab games in the field (Henrich et al., 2006). With a dictator game played in the
field, it would be possible to investigate responses given in real-world settings, while
keeping high levels of experimental control (Baran et al., 2010; Gneezy & Imas, 2016). 
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Urban residence effects on trust and trustworthiness 
4.1 Abstract
A growing body of research suggests that urban-dwellers experience higher anxiety and
stress levels, and that this might lead to reduced trust levels in others. Using an online
trust game to record trust and trustworthiness across different urban levels, I found that
increasing urbanicity negatively affected the decision to invest (trust), but not the
decision to reciprocate the investment (trustworthiness). Trustworthiness – but not trust
– was positively affected by the age of the trustee. These results support the idea that
urban-dwellers might be less trusting, but not necessarily less trustworthy than rural-
dwellers. 
4.2 Introduction
Many of our day-to-day interactions require an element of reciprocal trust in others. We
need to trust our interaction partners as we lack the information on their aims and future
actions, which implies that we need to take the risk of being exploited (Riegelsberger et
al., 2003). Thus, trust involves an initial acceptance of the trustor to be vulnerable, and a
consequent positive expectation of the actions of the trustee (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer
et al., 1995). Trustees, in turn, can exploit the trust given to them and act selfishly, or
they can reciprocate and act cooperatively. When trustees reciprocate they prove their
trustworthiness, a characteristic based on their trust-warranting traits, such as norms,
affections, and fears (Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001). 
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Trust and trustworthiness can be viewed as the product of local communities, and thus
expected to be correlated with community-level variables, such as population size,
population density, heterogeneity and crime rates of the community (House & Wolf,
1978). In particular, social theorists have long focused on the effects of cities on
individual attitudes. They argued that city-dwellers are less trusting, helpful and socially
involved than town-dwellers due to cognitive overload and the higher level of stressful
stimuli found in cities (Milgram, 1974; Wirth, 1938). City-dwellers should then adapt to
their environment by limiting the number of interactions as well as the degree of intimacy
with people in their community. 
Contemporary medical science has produced supporting evidence on the role of city life
on trust and cooperation. City-living is deleterious for our health and mental wellbeing
(Anderson & Jane, 2011; Dye, 2008; Peen et al., 2010). In particular, city-dwellers
experience higher levels of anxiety and stress via amygdala activation (Lederbogen et
al., 2011). These higher anxiety levels may lead to lower trust levels in others and thus
inhibit cooperation, as people may fear that their interaction partners will exploit them
rather than cooperate in return (House & Wolf, 1978). 
Field studies also support the concept of lower cooperation in city-dwellers in a variety of
contexts (Amato, 1983; Korte, 1980; Levine et al., 1994). At present, this difference
between urban and rural populations has been attributed to trust. For example, in a
study that examined refusal rates for a series of surveys over 20 years (House & Wolf,
1978), variation between urban and rural population refusal rates only appeared later in
time, and was linked to variation in reported crime rates rather than population size,
demonstrating that decreased trust due to rising crime was more important than
population density in determining pro-social attitudes. Moreover, in a recent study on
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cooperation, Nettle et al. (2011) argue that the differences recorded in helping behaviour
between a poor and a wealthy neighbourhood of the same city are underpinned by
variation in residents' trust levels; self-reported trust underlined lower trust levels in the
deprived neighbourhood compared to the wealthy neighbourhood, and was also
reflected in a lowered propensity to help. 
Here I examined the effects of urbanicity on trust levels and trustworthiness directly.
Consistent with other studies, I used a one-shot trust game to measure trust and
trustworthiness (Berg et al., 1995). In this game, one player (the investor) is given an
endowment and can decide whether to keep it or to entrust it to the second player (the
trustee). The amount sent is multiplied (usually tripled) by the experimenter and the
trustee then decides how much of the entrusted money to send back to the investor.
Despite standard economics predictions, for which investors follow their self-interest and
send nothing to the other player, results from the original Berg et al. (1995) study as well
as numerous replications consistently found that investors and trustees send positive
amounts of money to the other player (see Johnson & Mislin, 2011 for a meta-analysis).
The amount sent by investors is then used as proxy for trust, whereas the amount sent
back by trustees represents trustworthiness. 
In this study, the trust game was conducted online and players were matched with a
simulated counterpart. Players were asked to state where they lived in order to examine
the effects of urbanicity on trust and trustworthiness. In addition, each player was given
information regarding where their (simulated) partner came from. This allowed me to
further test whether trust and trustworthiness are influenced by: a) one's own
environment; b) one's expectations about how the partner's environment will affect their
behaviour; and c) in-group behaviour. In-group behaviour – for which people value and
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reward more in-group members than out-group members (Brewer, 1979) – was
considered as town dwellers might have a general expectancy that others will cooperate
within the in-group (depersonalized trust) (Brewer, 2008) which would not be found in
city dwellers, where fast overturn, heterogeneity, and lower community involvement
hinder the formation of in-group identification (Balliet et al., 2014). 
Based on the literature, I expected city-dwellers to be generally less trusting and thus to
keep most of the endowment irrespective of where the interaction partner was from.
Conversely, I expected that town-dwellers would be more trusting than city-dwellers, but
only when playing with interaction partners that were also from towns, rather than cities.
I expected that trust would be highest among town-dwellers when they were paired with
a partner from the same town as themselves. Also, I expected city-dwellers to be less
trustworthy and send back less money than town-dwellers regardless of where their
interaction partner was from. 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Procedure
Data were collected during June 2014. For this study, a total of n = 789 workers (n = 275
females, n = 512 males, n = two did not specify gender) were recruited via the online
labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; www.mturk.com (see Rand, 2012)). 
Workers received written instructions about the game and were required to answer two
comprehension questions correctly to participate. They were asked where they lived,
and then informed of their role in the game as 'Player 1' (the investor) or 'Player 2' (the
trustee) and that their worker ID would remain anonymous to the other worker (Appendix
II for game instructions). Both workers received $0.50 for participation in the game,
regardless of their role. A simulated counterpart was used to make sure all workers were
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receiving the same cues about the residence of the second worker and to better control
the effects of this variable. 
Investors were told that they could send any amount of their $0.50 endowment (in $0.05
increments) to their partner. Any money the investor kept would be paid to them as a
bonus. Any money they sent to the trustee would be tripled by the experimenter and
investors were informed that the trustee would then decide how much of this increased
endowment to return to the investor.  Investors were assigned to one of three
experimental treatments (Table 4.1). In Treatment 1, investors were told that the trustee
was from a large city (Dallas, Texas); in Treatment 2, investors were told that the trustee
was from a small town (Woodville Town, Texas); in Treatment 3, investors were told that
the trustee was from the same city or town as them (by copying and pasting the same
text input they gave when answering where they were from). After this, investors were
asked to choose how much of their endowment they wanted to send to the trustee (see
Appendix II for all instructions). 
Trustees were also assigned to one of the same three experimental treatments differing
in the simulated place of residence of the investor. In addition, trustees were informed
that investors either sent them $0.15 (meaning that they received $0.45) or that the
investor sent them $0.35 (meaning that they received $1.05). Thus, workers in the
trustee role were divided into six experimental treatments in total, as described in 
Table 4.1. Trustees were then asked to choose how much of the endowment received
they wanted to send back to the investor (in $0.05 increments; see Appendix II). 
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Table 4.1. Conditions for the two players in the trust game. Investors were tested for
three conditions, based on the origin of their simulated counterpart. Trustees were
tested for six conditions, based on the origin of their simulated counterpart and on the
amount received from them. 
After making their decisions, all workers were asked to provide their age, gender and
approximate annual income. In addition, investors were asked to state how much they
expected to receive back from the other worker. 
I excluded from the analysis n = 79 workers that gave an incomplete or mistyped answer
when asked their place of residence, since the answer to this question was presented as
the residence of the simulated worker (for the treatments where the worker was from the
same place of residence as them; see Appendix II). Exclusion from the analysis was
aimed at minimising the possibility that workers realised that they were playing against a
simulated counterpart and that their response was affected by it. Of the 710 workers left
for the analysis, 225 were females and 483 were males (two workers did not specify
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Player Other player Amount Condition
origin received
Investor Dallas, Texas 1
Woodville town, Texas 2
Same residence 3
Trustee Dallas, Texas $ 0.45 1
$ 1.05 2
Woodville town, Texas $ 0.45 3
$ 1.05 4
Same residence $ 0.45 5
$ 1.05 6
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gender). Age and income were divided into three and five categories, respectively (Table
4.2). The majority (n = 569) of workers were aged between 18 and 24, followed by
workers aged between 25 and 34 (n = 122). The third category comprised all workers of
age 35 and over (n = 19). Approximate annual income ranged from less than $12.500 to
over $100.000, with the $12.500-$25.000 interval being the most common (n = 255). Of
the 710 workers, 346 played in the investor role and 364 in the trustee role and they
were equally divided among the possible conditions (Table 4.1). I used the United States
2010 census data (US Census Bureau) and the 2010 Uniform Crime Reports (United
States Department of Justice) to retrieve information on population size and crime
reports of each location. Population size of residence ranged from 367 people to more
than 8 million people. The vast majority of workers (n = 565; 79.6%) were from cities of
over 20000 inhabitants. Models and results presented here use the log of population
size. Annual crime reports varied between locations, ranging from none to over 350000
(mean ± se = 2669.72 ± 606.43). Due to the strong positive correlation between crime
and population size (Pearson's correlation: r = 0.92, n = 198, p < 0.01) crime was not
included in the models. 
Table 4.2. Information on factor levels and sample sizes for the explanatory terms used
in the statistical models. 
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Variable Class
Age 0: 18-24 1: 25-34 2: 35< Total
569 122 19 710
Gender 0: Female 1: Male NA Total
225 483 2 710
Income 0: <$12.500 1: <$25.000 3: <$37.500 4: <$50.000 5: >$50.000 NA Total
194 255 136 68 25 32 710
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4.3.2 Analyses
4.3.2.1 Was the amount sent by investors predicted by their own environment or
their expectations about the other worker's environment?
I tested whether trust (amount sent to trustee) was predicted by population size of
residence and by the investor's residence, while controlling for age, gender and income
variables. I created a cumulative link mixed model (CLM) with the amount sent as a 10-
level ordinal response term (0 = gave $0.00 to 10 = gave $0.50) and the following
explanatory terms: population size of residence (continuous), residence of second
worker (binary: 0 = city; 1 = town), whether residence was said to be the same (0 =
same; 1 = different), investor gender (0 = male, 1 = female), age (3-level categorical)
and annual income (5-level categorical), and how much was expected back from the
other worker (4-level ordinal: 0 = nothing, 1 = some of the amount sent and tripled, 2 =
all of the amount sent and tripled, 3 = more than what sent).  
4.3.2.2 Was the amount sent back by investors predicted by their own
environment, the other worker's environment, or by the amount received?
I tested whether trustworthiness (amount sent back to investor) was predicted by
population size of residence and by the other worker's residence, while controlling for
age, gender and income variables. I created a CLM with the proportion of the amount
received that was returned as 3-level ordinal response term (0 = returned 0%; 1 =
returned less than 50%; 2 = returned more than 50%) and the following explanatory
terms: population size of residence (continuous), residence of second worker (0 = city; 1
= town), whether residence was the same (0 = same; 1 = different), investor gender (0 =
male; 1 = female), age (3-level categorical), annual income (5-level categorical) , and
amount received from investors (0 = $0.45; 1 = $1.05). 
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4.4 Results 
The amount entrusted to the other players was variable (mean ± se = 0.30 ± 10.70), but
sending the whole endowment ($0.50) was the most common choice (n = 124, 36%;
Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1. Histogram of amounts sent by investors to trustees. 
The majority of trustees (n = 99, 27%) chose to send back nothing to the investor
(Figure 4.2). The mean amount sent back (± se) was $0.24 (± 0.01).
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Figure 4.2. Histogram of amounts sent back by trustees to investors.
 
4.4.1 Was the amount sent by investors predicted by their own environment or
their expectations about the other worker's environment?
Population size of investor's residence was a component of two of the five top models
and had a weak negative effect on the amount sent (effect size = -0.06, CI: -0.24, -0.12;
Table 4.3; Figure 4.3).  Whether the other worker was from the same place had a strong
positive effect on the amount sent (effect size = 0.21, CI: 0.49, 0.03). 
With population size, other component variables in the top models were gender of the
Investor and the residence of other worker. Nevertheless, all confidence intervals for the
parameter estimates spanned zero, so there is little evidence that any of these variables
affected the amount sent (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.3. The top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc
values and Akaike weights for the model investigating the effects of population size of
investor and trustee residence on investment. Gender: gender of Investor; Origin:
population size of Trustee; Population: population size of Investor; Same: same place of
residence between Investor and Trustee. 
Table 4.4. Estimates, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals, and relative
importance for parameters included in the top models from Table 4.3. 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc Weight
1 Gender + Same 12 1331.87 0.29
2 Gender + Same + Population 13 1332.32 0.23
3 Gender + Same + Population + Origin:Population 14 1332.46 0.22
4 Same 11 1333.29 0.14
5 Gender + Origin + Same 13 1333.87 0.11
Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Origin 0.22 0.11 (-0.06, 0.45)
Population -0,06 0.01
Same 0.21 0.12 (0.49, 0.03)
Origin:Population -0,14 0.10 (-0.17, 0.11)
Gender -0.01 0.03 (-0.07, 0.06)
(-0.24, -0.12)
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Figure 4.3. Scatter plot with best fit line representing the relationship between amount
sent by investors and population size of their place of residence. 
4.4.2 Was the amount sent back by trustees predicted by their own environment,
the other worker's environment, or on the amount received?
Age of worker (effect size = 0.22, CI: 0.01, 0.43) was a component of all top models
(Table 4.5) and had a marginal positive effect on the amount sent back. The other
components of the top models were gender of the trustee, population size of trustee
residence, whether the other worker was from the same place, the other worker's
residence, and the amount received form the investor. Nevertheless, confidence
intervals for these components spanned zero (Table 4.6), suggesting little evidence that
they have affected the amount sent back. 
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Table 4.5. The top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc
values and Akaike weights for the model investigating the effects of population size of
investor and trustee residence on reciprocation of investment. Age: age of Trustee,
Gender: gender of Trustee; Population: population size of Trustee; Same: same place of
residence between Trustee and Investor, Origin:  population size of Investor; Received:
amount received from Investor. 
Table 4.6. Estimates, unconditional standard errors, confidence intervals, and relative
importance for parameters included in the top models from Table 4.5. 
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Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Age 0.22 0.11 (0.01, 0.43)
Gender -0,11 0.10 (-0.15, 0.10)
Origin -0.12 0.11 (-0.21, 0.12)
Population -0,07 0.10 (-0.07, 0.06)
Same 0.08 0.11 (-0.11, 0.09)
Received 0.04 0.1 (-0.05, 0.06)
Model Rank Parameters df AICc Weight
1 Age 3 736.22 0.26
2 Age + Gender 4 736.93 0.13
3 Age + Origin 4 737.38 0.12
4  Age + Population 4 737.75 0.09
5 Age + Origin + Same 5 738.02 0.08
6 Age + Received 4 738.1 0.07
7 Age + Same 4 738.1 0.07
Chapter 4. Urban residence effects on trust and trustworthiness
4.5 Discussion 
In this experiment, city living had a strong negative effect on the amount investors sent,
suggesting city-dwellers are less trusting than town-dwellers. This adds to a growing
body of research showing city life is negatively associated with trust towards strangers
(Balliet et al., 2014; Lederbogen et al., 2011; Gächter et al., 2004). Furthermore, the
place of residence of the trustee was not used as a clue of trustworthiness: city dwellers
were as trusting towards other city dwellers as towards town dwellers. 
 
Despite being less trusting, individuals from urban environments were not less
trustworthy. This finding is at odds with the common belief that city dwellers are
generally less cooperative (trustworthy) than town dwellers (Amato, 1983; Korte, 1980;
Levine et al., 1994). Importantly, as there is no face to face interaction in this
experiment, and no scope for reputation based concern or fear of social sanctioning,
players returning money were actually showing trustworthiness (see Baran et al., 2010
in real-world trust game). That trustworthiness was not predicted by urbanicity level but
trust was, suggests that city-dwellers are cooperative but nevertheless avoid the risks
associated with trusting others. 
Are then, generally speaking, risks higher for city dwellers than town dwellers? Field
studies in urban environments have reported a trend with lower cooperation towards
strangers when the crime rate is higher (Blau & Blau, 1982; House & Wolf, 1978). This
suggests urban-rural variation in cooperation is produced by the higher crime rates
(registered or perceived) in cities compared to towns. More recent work has supported
the idea of a negative correlation between low socio-economic status and trust or
cooperation (Silva & Mace, 2014). The main explanation put forth is that people
experiencing poor conditions are less open to risk taking in interacting with strangers as
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their resources are already limited. This would lead them to avoid interactions, thus
being less pro-social (Nettle et al., 2011; Silva & Mace, 2014).
Nevertheless, it is often complicated to separate socio-economic status and crime rates
of an area. There is a strong positive correlation between deprivation and crime
(Sutherland et al., 2013; Tarling & Dennis, 2016) and distrust is likely to be found in
deprived areas rather than in cities per se (Nettle et al., 2011). However, a strong
positive correlation is also found between urbanicity and crime (Glaeser et al., 1996). In
this experiment it was not possible to separate the effects of these two variables. 
Here no detailed information about the local environmental condition was acquired (as
players only stated the city or town of residence rather than the neighbourhood) making
it impossible to tell apart the effects of urbanicity, socio-economic status, and crime
rates. Further testing could separate these factors. Ideally, a real-world trust game
conducted in defined geographic areas differing for urbanicity, crime and wealth could
mix the positive factors of lab and real-world experiments. Lab games in the field enable
to investigate the behaviour in real-world settings, while keeping high levels of
experimental control, thus reducing confounds and replicability issues (Baran et al.,
2010; Gneezy & Imas, 2016). Moreover, real world lab games are especially useful for
comparing responses between different populations and contexts (Henrich et al., 2006). 
Some limitations of the experimental approach should also be acknowledged. Principal
among these is that the results were obtained using a stylised economic task, where
participants interacted anonymously and did not know the other individual. These
conditions are arguably unrepresentative of most of our daily encounters involving trust
(Raihani & Bshary, 2015). Despite the criticism received (Levitt & List, 2007), an
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increasing number of studies validate results in economic games and in real world
contexts (Baran et al., 2010; Benz & Meier, 2008; Peysakhovich et al., 2014; Stoop,
2014). Another potential limitation is that these results were obtained using AMT, rather
than in a more controlled laboratory setting. It has been suggested the online
environment might produce markedly different results to those that would be obtained
under more traditional lab-based settings (Crump et al., 2013; Gosling et al., 2004). This
effect could arise because online workers are not alone, might participate more than
once in a study, may be multi-tasking, or might have taken part in similar tasks many
times before (Crump et al., 2013; Germine et al., 2012). 
Despite these valid concerns, it is reassuring that several seminal findings have been
shown to replicate in online and laboratory settings (e.g. Rand, 2012; Horton et al.,
2011). Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that behaviour in online games also
reflects the attitudes and behaviour of these subjects in the real world. A recent study by
Peysakhovich et al. (2014) showed that pro-social behaviour in online experiments was
a positive predictor of both-self-reported and actual pro-social behaviour in the real
world. One important concern we are unable to rule out is that participants in this task
may not have believed they were playing with a real partner – if so this would be
expected to result in lowered trust and trustworthiness (Sanfey et al., 2003). 
Typically, amounts sent and returned in trust games vary significantly. The coefficients of
variation found in a meta-analysis were around 0.30 for both trust and trustworthiness,
with an average of 50% sent by investors and 37% sent by trustees (Johnson & Mislin,
2011). In this study, investors were willing to send an average of 60% of their
endowment and trustees sent back 31% in proportion to the amount received, which is
in line with the typical results. It is not possible to rule out the possibility that participants
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may have realised deception, but it seems unlikely this had an effect on trust and
trustworthiness. 
It is nevertheless possible that the effect of city living on responses in this experiment
was limited by the use of an online platform. In fact it is not possible to rule out the
possibility that reduced cooperation found in city-dwellers in previous studies is context
dependent and not internalised. Under this circumstance, city-dwellers would act as pro-
socially as town-dwellers if in the same context. On the AMT platform, workers are
unlikely to be experiencing the same context as they would in the real-world. Once
again, the use of lab games in the field would enable to address this issue by testing
behaviour in real-world settings (Baran et al., 2010; Gneezy & Imas, 2016). 
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Chapter 5
Urban residence effects on four real-world help measures 
5.1 Abstract
Previous studies have demonstrated remarkable variation in human cooperation
depending on the environmental context. In particular, city-dwellers are reportedly less
cooperative than their rural-dwelling counterparts. These findings raise the possibility
that differences in pro-social tendencies may be affected by the environmental features
people experience in their every-day life. With over half of the world population living in
cities, it is of primary importance to understand how city life may influence our
behaviour. With this study, I conducted a set of real-world experiments in 12 cities and
12 towns across the UK. I used measures such as willingness to return a 'lost letter', to
return a 'dropped item', to stop to let someone cross the road, and to donate to a charity
collection to test: i) whether city-dwellers are less pro-social than town-dwellers across
different forms of helping; ii) whether urban-rural variation in pro-sociality can be
explained by “diffusion of responsibility” or iii) by “perceived anonymity” often
experienced in cities. Results showed that urban-rural differences in pro-social
tendencies are not as clearly defined as previously believed, and suggested the
importance of socio-economic factors, rather than urbanicity per se, in shaping our
cooperative tendency. 
5.2 Introduction
One of the main challenges in studies of human cooperation is explaining the
remarkable variation in pro-social tendency. Previous empirical research has
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demonstrated that variation in measures of pro-sociality may depend on the
environmental context (Bowles et al., 2003; Pepper & Nettle, 2017; Rand & Nowak,
2013; Silva & Mace, 2014). One major environmental context that has received little
attention in experimental studies is urbanicity. Urbanisation – the gradual shift of
population from rural to urban areas – is one of the most important causes of
demographic change nowadays (UN DESA, 2014). Thus, it is important to understand
how these rapid changes may affect us. 
Early social theorists have hypothesised that urban living would be detrimental for pro-
social tendency and that in highly populated communities it would be less likely to
receive help from a stranger (Milgram, 1974; Simmel, 1950; Wirth, 1938). A number of
studies in the helping literature found only partial support for this hypothesis (e.g. Amato,
1983; Goldman et al., 1983; Merrens, 1973; Korte & Kerr, 1975; Rushton, 1978). In a
review, Steblay (1987) found a moderate although significant negative correlation
between population size of the community and helping behaviour. Nevertheless, the
threshold in population size varies largely across studies, ranging from 20,000 (Amato,
1983) to over 300,000 (Steblay, 1987). In more recent studies Levine (1994; 2008) also
found that the strongest predictors of helping across different cities in the United States
were population size and density. However, no rural sample was considered and
population size ranged from over 350,000 to 4,000,000 inhabitants. 
More importantly, the vast majority of studies in the urban-rural literature are conducted
in central/business areas of cities and towns, but little is known about the
representativeness of this sample. For example, in one study that looked at variation in
help between business and residential areas of cities and towns, Goldman et al. (1983)
found that significantly more help was given in residential areas, independently of
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urbanicity. In addition, lower pro-social tendencies are often also associated with lower
socio-economic well-being and crime rates, but these are also measured at a city/town
level and thus are likely unrepresentative of the wide variability within single cities
(Aldonas et al., 2007; Nettle et al., 2011). It seems particularly important to adopt an
adequate level of analysis, as inequality and deprivation that strongly affect the poor
may trigger anti-social behaviour (Muggah, 2012; Winton, 2004). 
Specifically, a growing body of studies corroborate the idea that socio-economic status
affects cooperative tendency. For example, using a lost letter experiment in 20 London
neighbourhoods with a wide range of income deprivation scores, Holland et al. (2012)
found that odds of the letter being returned were 91% lower in neighbourhoods with low
income than in high-income neighbourhoods. A similar experiment conducted in
Australia reported the same trend (Grueter et al., 2016). More extensive work also
reports socio-economic status to be a major determinant of cooperative tendency
(Korndorfer et al., 2014; Silva & Mace, 2014). In particular, Korndorfer et al. (2014) used
results from eight large-sample studies and found a consistent positive effect of social
class on cooperation. Wealthy individuals were more likely to make a donation to a
charity, to volunteer, and they reported to be more helpful towards others on a day-to-
day basis than poor individuals. 
In contrast to these findings, a number of other studies (Cote et al., 2012; Kraus et al.,
2010; Kraus et al., 2011; Piff et al., 2010; Piff et al., 2012) show that low-wealth
individuals are more pro-social than their high-wealth counterparts in a variety of
contexts. It is theorised that lower class individuals have less control and need to relay
more on others for their future (Johnson & Krueger, 2005; 2006). This increased need
for others could underpin a greater compassion and engagement in fairness and pro-
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sociality. Nevertheless, a number of methodological differences may explain the different
results. Firstly, the majority of these studies are laboratory or online experiments rather
than field studies, and use extensively a student sample. More importantly, the socio-
economic status is mostly self-reported, or is a perceived status in a ranking which is
often manipulated experimentally. Finally, the sample is from the United States, which
leaves open the possibility for a cultural difference in behaviour (Levine, 2003). 
Here I aimed at solving these methodological shortcomings by selecting a convenience
sample of 12 cities and 12 towns based on population size and density to replicate
results of the urban-rural literature, and then using a neighbourhood-level analysis of
socio-economic status of the area, for a better control and understanding of the factors
influencing the urban-rural discrepancy in helping behaviour recorded. Thus, the
experiments were run in high-wealth and low-wealth neighbourhoods of cities and
towns, rather than in city and town centres alone. I used four different help measures to
control whether the results were robust across different measures. In particular, I used
lost letter, dropped item, jaywalking, and charity collection experiments. More
importantly, I also tested the main explanations advanced for explaining the urban-rural
variation in helping. 
In fact, despite the evidence that population size and density are negatively associated
with cooperative tendency, it is not clear what features of city-life might undermine
cooperation. It might be that, as a consequence of high population density of cities, city-
dwellers experience 'psychological overload' (Milgram, 1974) - which occurs when the
sensory inputs exceed the system's capacity of processing them. The system must then
prioritise some stimuli over others, and in doing so, it might overlook the possibility to act
pro-socially. According to this idea then, city-dwellers would be just as likely as town-
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dwellers to help when not experiencing overload. Another possible explanation for the
urban-rural variation in cooperative tendency is that city-dwellers are more susceptible
to the 'bystander effect' (Darley, 1967; Latane & Darley, 1970). In this circumstance, the
likelihood of helping decreases with the increase in the number of onlookers. Thus, in
cities, where the number of onlookers is often higher than in towns, levels of cooperation
maybe lower. 
Finally, the type of interactions that are more likely to take place in a highly populated
city, are one-shot interactions with strangers. Such a context leaves little scope for
reciprocity and for reputation gain associated with helping, as well as punishment of
antisocial behavior (Milgram, 1974; Turner et al., 1987; Zimbardo, 1969). These are two
important factors in promoting cooperation between unrelated individuals (West et al.,
2007). This anonymity found in cities may be a key-factor underpinning any variance in
cooperation levels. In particular, anonymity would arise when personal value or
judgement lack, and individuals are not identified by others. This state of 'de-
individualisation' could lead to antisocial and aggressive behaviour (Ellison et al., 1995;
Reicher, 1984; Turner et al., 1987; Zimbardo, 1969). 
In this study, I address these issues with the use of real-world measures. I aimed to
capture the context-dependent characteristic of cooperation by measuring cooperative
behaviour in a naturalistic environment. Moreover, all individuals in this study were not
aware that they were part of an experiment, reducing the artificiality usually associated
with laboratory and lab-in-the-field economic games. Based on the literature, my
predictions were that, for each help measure, people would help more in towns than in
cities, and in high-wealth neighbourhoods rather than in low-wealth neighbourhoods. I
expected higher help levels when people were directly approached for help (no
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bystander effect), and when asked to help in the presence of their social group (no
anonymity). 
5.3 Methods
5.3.1 Procedures 
I conducted four large-scale experiments as well as direct observations to measure
cooperative behaviour across 12 cities and 12 towns in the UK (Table 5.1). For each city,
I selected two neighbourhoods, one high-wealth and one low-wealth, based on their
national IMD. As for towns, I selected either a high-wealth or a low-wealth
neighbourhood each, due to their lower variability in terms of wealth range within
(Supporting material 5.6.1). 
Table 5.1 Cities and towns selected for the study with their respective population size.  
Neighbourhood level analysis allowed me to have a focused control over demographic
variables. In addition, at each testing site I conducted direct observations to control for
additional community-level variables not captured by LSOAs census data, such as the
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City Population Town Population
Birmingham 1020589 Helensburgh 14220
Leeds 726939 Middlewich 13595
Glasgow 616430 Jaywick 4668
Sheffield 530375 Polesworth 9645
Cardiff 315040 Radstock 9419
Liverpool 467995 Redruth 19902
Edinburgh 448850 St Andrews 16870
282338 15210
Bristol 399633 Camborne 20436
Nottingham 283969 Wombourne 13511
Manchester 430818 Hawick 14294
Plymouth 255826 Abercynon 6390
Newcastle
Upon-Tyne
Saffron
Walden
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mean number of cars passing by (cars crossing a marked line in a ten minutes period),
the number of people walking by (people crossing a marked line in a ten minutes period)
and their walking speed (seconds needed to walk a marked ten metres distance). This
information was used to test the overload hypothesis. This test, although not perfect,
was satisfactory for the testing conditions and comparable with previous studies (Amato,
1983; Levine et al., 1994; 2008). For the experiments, I used lost letter, dropped item,
and jaywalking experiments in 36 neighbourhoods with different socio-economic
characteristics, and charity collection experiments in 10 cities and 9 town centres. Full
procedures can be found in Chapter 2. 
To test the bystander effect, I used a direct versus indirect help request in three of the
experiments (i.e. no direct request in the jaywalking experiment), as picking out a person
in the crowd should cancel the diffusion of responsibility (Flynn & Lake, 2008; Goldman
et al., 1983; Steblay, 1987). In the lost letter experiment, the indirect request was made
by simply dropping the letter on the pavement (as per Milgram et al., 1965) whereas the
direct request was made by leaving the letter on a car's windscreen with a note saying
“Could you post this for me, please? Thank you”. This method was based on the
evidence that people respond less to help general requests than to direct help requests
in chat rooms (Markey, 2000) and that merely priming a social context leads to less
helping in a subsequent and unrelated task, showing that the physical presence of
others is not needed to elicit the diffusion of responsibility (Garcia et al., 2002). To test
the effects of anonymity on helpful behaviour, I recorded responses to help requests
made to people alone and people in a group. I used three help measures for this test:
the dropped item, the jaywalking and the charity collection measures (i.e. no information
recorded on who found the lost letters). 
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a) Lost letter experiment
For the lost letter experiment, I dropped 472 stamped letters on the pavement with the
address facing up on rain and wind free mornings. In addition, to test the effects of direct
help requests, I left 439 letters on cars’ windscreens with a post-it saying: “Could you
post this for me, please? Thank you”. All letters were addressed by hand to a PO box
address with the addressee's name made neutral by only using the name's initial (i.e. E.
Zwirner). I used the return rates of the letters from the three treatments to measure the
neighbourhood levels of cooperation. I controlled for the number of post-boxes and the
mean number of trash visible recorded during transects in each neighbourhood. 
b) Dropped item experiment
In the dropped item experiment, I walked in front of a selected subject (i.e. 18 years or
older, not carrying bags, and had no physical handicap) and dropped a handful of 20
cards on the pavement when the subject was approximately 5 metres away. I then
kneeled down and began picking them up one at a time. This experiment was carried
398 times in the 36 neighbourhoods. In 174 instances, I directly asked for help when I
bent down retrieve the cards by looking the subject and asking: “Could you help me,
please?”. In the remaining 194 instances I bent down and looked at the subject, but
never directly asked for help. After picking up the envelopes, I recorded gender and
estimated age of the subject, whether he/she stopped to pick up any cards, if the subject
was alone, and, if not,  the gender of whom he/she was with. 
c) Jaywalking experiment
In the jaywalking experiment, I stood on the sidewalk and started to cross the road when
the selected car (i.e. inside the speed limits and with no other car behind) was
approximately 10 meters away. If the car slowed down/stopped I continued to cross the
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road, if it did not, I stepped back on the sidewalk. After the attempt to cross the road, I
recorded whether the car stopped to let me cross the road, whether the driver was
alone, and their gender and estimated age. This experiment was conducted 90 times in
26 neighbourhoods.
d) Charity collection experiment
Finally, I conducted charity collections for the charity Doctors Without Borders
(www.doctorswithoutborders.org) in the central area of 10 cities and 9 towns. Charity
collections took place during weekday mornings, between 09:00 and 13:00. During
charity collections, I stood on the pavement with a branded T-shirt and branded hand-
held collection bucket. Every third suitable pedestrian (i.e. 18 years or older, not carrying
bags, and had no physical handicap) was selected as a subject. I switched between
three experimental procedures every 15 minutes. These three treatments allowed me to
test the effects of direct and indirect requests on donations. In one treatment, I asked
directly for a donation by approaching the selected subject and saying: “Hello, would you
like to make a donation for Doctors without Borders?”. In the second treatment, I smiled
and made eye contact with a subject while holding the collection bucket in sight, but
never directly asked for a donation. And in the third treatment I stood smiling silently on
the sidewalk without approaching or making eye contact to any potential subject, but
every 30 seconds I would shake the collection bucket and ask for donations saying:
“Please, make a donation for Doctor without Borders” without looking at anyone in the
crowd. A second experimenter stood at a minimum distance of 10 metres away from the
collection point and recorded the number of people passing in front of me (using a
clicker), the gender of the subject, his/her estimated age, whether he/she contributed
with a donation or not, and if the subject was alone or not (due to the local high-density
of people present, no information on age and gender of the other group members was
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recorded). 
5.3.2 Analysis
I created four different models, one for each help measures, and used the binary
response term of whether help was given or not for each request. In all models I used
binary variables also for urbanicity levels (city/town) and for wealth of neighbourhoods
(high-/low-wealth). This was done after establishing that these categories reflect the
national IMD, employment, income and crime scores and that no qualitative difference
was present in the outcome of the analyses using the original variables. 
5.3.2.1 Were neighbourhoods of cities and towns environmentally different? 
As a preliminary step, I used the information collected in the 36 neighbourhoods during
observations to test whether cities and towns, as well as high- and low-wealth
neighbourhoods, differed in: the mean number of people observed, their gender and age
composition, mean number of groups observed and the number of people per social
group (i.e. individuals walking together), mean walking speed (seconds/metre) by
marking a 10 metres zone on the sidewalk, and the mean number of cars passing a pre-
established line on the street. 
5.3.2.2 What predicted the return rate of lost letters? 
I created a binary response variable (0 = letter not returned and 1 = letter returned) and
used a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) with the place where the experiment
was conducted as a random effect and the following explanatory terms: whether the
letter was left in a city or in a town (binary: 0 = city, 1 = town), whether it was left in a
high-wealth or in a low wealth neighbourhood (0 = high-wealth, 1 = low-wealth), whether
the letter was dropped on the pavement (indirect request) or left on a car's windscreen
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(direct request; 0 = direct, 1 = indirect), and the three interactions between the variables
(i.e. urbanicity and wealth, urbanicity and type of help request, and wealth and type of
help request). In addition, the mean number of post boxes, the mean number of trash
pieces recorded per transect, the mean number of people observed and their mean
walking speed (m/s) recorded in the neighbourhood were included as controls in the
analysis. Nevertheless,  the mean number of visible trash pieces was strongly correlated
to the wealth of the neighbourhood, and in the final analysis I used the residual variance
in trash not explained by wealth, rather than the mean number of trash pieces. The total
number of observations for this model was n =  911. 
5.3.2.3 What predicted helping in the dropped item experiment?
I created a GLMM with a binary response variable (0 = did not help to pick up the cards
1 = helped to pick up the cards) and the following explanatory terms: whether the
experiment took place in a city or in a town (binary: 0 = city, 1 = town), whether it took
place in a high-wealth or in a low wealth neighbourhood (0 = high-wealth, 1 = low-
wealth), whether I asked directly or indirectly for help (0 = direct, 1 = indirect), 
whether the subject was alone (0 = in group, 1 = alone), gender (0= male, 1 = female)
and their estimated age (3-level categorical: 1 = 18-29 years old, 2 = 30-49, 3 = 50 and
over). I included the interactions between urbanicity and wealth, urbanicity and type of
help request, and neighbourhood wealth and type of help request. Additionally, I
included the mean number of trash pieces recorded per transect, the mean number of
people observed and their mean walking speed (m/s) recorded during observations in
the neighbourhood. The place where the experiment was conducted was included in the
model as a random effect. The total number of observations for this model was n =  398.
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5.3.2.4 What predicted helping in the jaywalking experiment?
Similarly, I created a GLMM with a binary response variable (0 = car did not stop, 1 = car
stopped) and the following explanatory terms: whether the experiment took place in a
city or in a town (binary: 0 = city, 1 = town), whether it took place in a high-wealth or in a
low wealth neighbourhood (0 = high-wealth, 1 = low-wealth), whether the subject was
alone in the car (0 = in group, 1 = alone), their gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and their
estimated age (3-level categorical: 1 = 18-29 years old, 2 = 30-49, 3 = 50 and over). I
included the interaction between urbanicity and wealth.  Additionally, I included he mean
number of cars passing a pre-established line on the street, the mean number of people
observed and their mean walking speed (m/s) recorded in the neighbourhood, and the
place where the experiment was conducted was included in the model as a random
effect. The total number of observations for this model was n =  90. 
5.3.2.5 What predicted donations in the charity collection experiment?
For charity collections, I firstly I tested whether the three conditions (direct, indirect, and
general requests) differed in the total number of donations made following a request for
donation (chi-squared tests with Bonferroni correction). Then I ran a GLMM model with
binary response term (0 = no donation, 1 = donation) and five explanatory variables:
whether the experiment took place in a city or in a town (binary: 0 = city, 1 = town),
whether I asked directly or indirectly for a donation (0 = direct, 1 = indirect), whether the
subject was alone (0 = in group, 1 = alone), their gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and their
estimated age (3-level categorical: 1 = 18-29 years old, 2 = 30-49, 3 = 50 and over), and
the interaction between the urbanicity and type of request. Finally, I used the mean
number of people observed walking pass (at a distance less than three meters from me)
during the time of the collection for each block (i.e. direct/indirect request), and the place
where the experiment was conducted was included in the model as a random effect. 
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5.4 Results
The strongest predictor of helping for the lost letter, dropped item, and jaywalking
experiments was wealth. In all helping episodes (other than the charity collection that
took place in the central area), there was a clear trend for helping rates to decrease in
low-wealth neighbourhoods (Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1 Bar plot with error bars of the percentage of helping episodes in high- wealth
and low-wealth neighbourhoods for three help measures. 
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5.4.1 Were neighbourhoods of cities and towns environmentally different? 
The table in Supporting materials 5.6.2 summarises the values of community variables
recorded during the direct observations and transects. I found no significant difference
between neighbourhoods of cities and towns in the mean number of people passing by
in a 10 minutes interval  (city: mean ± se = 35.35 ± 3.33; town: 27.38 ± 6.45), nor in the
mean walking speed (in seconds) over a 10-metres distance (city: 6.44 ± 0.08; town:
6.20 ± 0.13). Significantly more cars passed by in neighbourhoods of cities rather than
towns (city; mean ± se = 105.7 ± 7.99, town: 73.97 ± 10.45; t-test: t = 2.41, df = 25.57, p
= 0.02). Moreover, a significant difference was found between neighbourhoods of
different wealth, with more trash found in low-wealth neighbourhoods than high-wealth
neighbourhoods (low-wealth: mean ± se = 18.21 ± 5.35, high-wealth: 5.84 ± 1.05; t-test:
t = -2.27, df = 19.38, p = 0.03). 
5.4.2 What predicted the return rate of lost letters?
Overall, 491 of the 911 lost letters (54%) were returned. In cities 57% (n = 322) of the
letters were posted, compared to 49% (n = 150) in towns. Lost letters were more likely
to be posted when left on windscreens (direct request) than when left on the pavement
(effect size = -0.43; CI: -0.91, -0.15), even when controlling for the amount of trash on
the street (effect size = -0.0004; CI: -0.01, 0.01). Letters where also less likely to be
posted in low-wealth neighbourhoods (effect size = -1.95; CI: -2.01, -1.54), particularly in
the direct-request condition (effect size = 1.27; CI: 0.58, 1.72; Figure 5.2; Table 5.2).  
Urbanicity and the interaction between urbanicity and the type of request were also
component variables of the top models, but their confidence intervals spanned zero,
suggesting that they were not likely to affect help (Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.2 Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on lost letters return rate. Request:
type of request made, Wealth: wealth of neighbourhood, Urbanicity: urbanicity level of
settlement, Trash: residual values for number of pieces of trash not explained by wealth
of neighbourhood. 
Table 5.3 Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 5.2. 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Request + Wealth + 7 1009.14
2 Request + Wealth + 6 1009.73
3 Request + Wealth + 5 1010.11
4 Request + Wealth + 8 1010.4
5 Request + Wealth + 8 1010.61
Urbanicity + Request : Wealth +
Urbanicity : Wealth 
Urbanicity + Request : Wealth
Request : Wealth
Urbanicity + Request : Wealth +
Urbanicity : Wealth +
Request : Urbanicity
Urbanicity + Request : Wealth +
Urbanicity : Wealth + Trash
Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Request -0.43 0.21 (-0.91, -0.15)
Wealth -1.95 0.3 (-2.01, -1.54)
Urbanicity -0.11 0.4 (-0.93, 0.65)
1.27 0.31 (0.58, 1.72)
-0.51 0.27 (-2.01, 0.73)
-0.22 0.2 (-0.74, 0.30) 
Trash <0.001 0.004 (-0.01, 0.01)
Request : Wealth
Urbanicity : Wealth
Request : Urbanicity
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Figure 5.2 Bar plot with error bars of the interaction between type of request and wealth
of neighbourhood for the lost letter experiment. Direct requests had a negative effect on
return rate for letters left in low-wealth neighbourhoods. 
5.4.3 What predicted helping in the dropped item experiment?
Overall, I received help in 33% of the instances in both cities (n = 89 on 272) and towns
(n =  41 on 126). I was more likely to be helped in the high-wealth than in the low-wealth
neighbourhoods (effect size = -0.21; CI: -0.12, -0.35) and when the subject was alone
rather than in group (effect size = 0.18; CI: 0.12, 0.30; Figure 5.3; Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4 Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on helping in the dropped item
experiment. Request: type of request made, Wealth: wealth of neighbourhood, Alone:
whether the subject was alone or in a group, Gender: gender of subject, Load: number
of people passing by. 
Type of request, the interaction between wealth and the type of request, the gender of
subjects, and the mean number of people passing by during observations were also
component variables of the top models, but their confidence intervals spanned zero,
suggesting that they were not likely to affect help in this experiment (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 5.4. 
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Wealth + Alone 4 849.41
2 Wealth + Alone 5 849.7
3 Gender + Wealth + Alone 5 850.03
4 Gender + Wealth + Alone 6 850.11
5 5 850.29
Request : Wealth
Request : Wealth
Wealth + Request + Load
Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Gender 0.03 0.03 (-0.43, 0.1)
Wealth -0.21 0.04 (-0.12, -0.30)
Alone 0.18 0.04 (0.12, 0.30)
0.1 0.08 (-0.22, 0.15)
Request 0.02 0.02 (-0.05, 0.11)
Load 0.03 0.02 (-0.24, 0.51)
Request : Wealth
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Figure 5.3 Bar plot of the counts of helping and non-helping episodes with subjects
alone and subjects in group for the dropped item experiment.  
5.4.4 What predicted helping in the jaywalking experiment?
In cities cars stopped to allow crossing the street 30% (n = 19 on 62 events) of the
times, and in towns cars stopped 31% of the times (n = 9 on 28 events). Cars were less
likely to stop for a jaywalker in the low-wealth neighbourhood than in the high-wealth
neighbourhood (effect size = -0.44; CI: -0.11, -0.30; Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6 Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on helping in the jaywalking
experiment. Wealth: wealth of neighbourhood, Gender: gender of subject. 
Gender of the subject was also a component of one of the top models, but confidence
intervals for this variable spanned zero, suggesting that it had no effect on helping
(Table 5.7). Urbanicity was not a component of any of the top models. 
Table 5.7 Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 5.6. 
5.4.5 What predicted donations in the charity collection experiment? 
In the charity collection experiment, direct donation requests held significantly different
results from indirect requests (Chi-squared = 19.98, df = 1, p < 0.001; Bonferroni
adjusted alpha levels 0.0125) and from general requests (Chi-squared = 39.65, df = 1, p
< 0.001). On the other hand, no significant difference was found between indirect and
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Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Wealth 3 701.3
2 Wealth + Gender 4 701.51
Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Gender 0.03 0.05 (-0.29, 0.58)
Wealth -0.44 0.09 (-0.11, -0.30)
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general requests for donations (Chi-squared = 4.55, df = 1, p = 0.03; Table 5.8). In the
global model, only direct and indirect donation requests were used in the 'type of
request' variable. 
Table 5.8 Donations for the three treatments in the charity collection experiment. 
Overall, 21% of the subjects in cities and 25% of the subjects in towns contributed with a
donation.  A total of n = 61 donations were made in cities and n = 56 in towns. Donations
were less likely to be made when the requests were indirect (effect size = -1.35; CI:
-2.73, -0.21), whereas subjects alone were more likely to make a donation than subjects
in a group (effect size = 0.33; CI: -0.16, 0.89; Table 5.9), although confidence intervals
for this variable spanned zero (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.9 Top models (models within 2AICc units of the best model), with AICc values
for model investigating the effects of population size on donations. Request: type of
request made, Alone: whether the subject was alone or in a group, Load: number of
people passing by, Urbanicity: urbanicity level of settlement. 
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Direct Indirect General
No Donation 175 213 202
Donation 81 36 17
Model Rank Parameters df AICc
1 Alone + Request + 5 831.91
2 Alone + Request + Urbanicity + 6 831.95
3 Alone + Request 4 831.97
4 Alone + Request + Load 6 832.03
5 4 832.08
Alone : Request
Alone : Request
Alone : Request
Alone : Request + Load 
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Other components of the top models were urbanicity, the number of people passing by,
and the interaction between the type of request for donations and whether the subjects
was alone. Confidence intervals for both these variables spanned zero (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 Estimates, unconditional standard errors and confidence intervals for
parameters included in the top models from Table 5.9. 
5.5 Discussion
In this study, I used four help measures and I aimed to test whether city-dwellers were
less cooperative than town-dwellers and, if so, why. Moreover, I tested the influence of
socio-economic factors on cooperation. I found no evidence that city-living is associated
with lower pro-sociality. In all four experiments, city-dwellers were as likely as town
dwellers to help. Interestingly, no significant differences were found between cities and
towns in the two most commonly used (Amato, 1983; Levine et al., 1994; 2008)
measures of load (i.e. number of people, walking speed) when measured at the
neighbourhood level. This could suggest that environmental features found in city
centres but not in town centres are responsible for the urban-rural variation in previous
studies, as here the focus was on neighbourhoods rather than central areas.
Nevertheless, here one help measure (i.e. the charity collection) was conducted in city
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Parameter Estimate SE Confidence Interval
Alone 0.33 0.23 (-0.16, 0.89)
Request -1.35 0.22 (-2.73, -0.21)
1.01 0.03 (-0.23, 3.4)
Urbanicity -0.45 0.4 (-1.31, 0.37)
Load -0.05 0.21 (-0.24, 0.99)
Alone : Request
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and town centres and no urban-rural variation in helping was recorded. One possible
explanation for this discrepancy could be that the methodology of the experiment
interfered with the normal charity collection. In particular, the long moments of indirect
and general requests, as well as the presence of a single collector were atypical. This
might have been more noticeable in small towns rather than in cities (personal
observation), which could have led to a reduced number of donations made in towns in
this experiment. 
The main predictor of help was wealth, with rich neighbourhoods more likely to post a
lost letter, to return a dropped item, and to allow a pedestrian to cross the road, than
poor neighbourhoods. This finding adds to the evidence that socio-economic factors
play an important role in shaping human behaviour (Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Korndorfer
et al., 2014; Pepper & Nettle, 2017). Importantly, this correlation is consistent across
different measures despite the fact that none of them implies any direct financial cost for
the helper. This finding also suggests that the lack of urban-rural variation in cooperation
in this study might be maybe due to the different level of analysis used compared to
previous studies. In particular, here I employed a neighbourhood-level of analysis and
looked at deprivation and crime in small areas where the experiments were conducted,
rather than using overall city or town values of deprivation and crime. It seems that a
city/town level of analysis is too broad to capture the effects of local deprivation.
Specifically, cities have a wider range of neighbourhoods' wealth within (Pateman,
2011), thus an overall city/town wealth analysis wouldn't have caught this difference
between urbanicity and wealth effects.  
Moreover, it is interesting to notice that lost letters were less likely to be returned when
dropped in low-wealth neighbourhoods in both direct and indirect requests. This
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eliminates the possibility that letters are not returned as they might have been confused
as litter when left on the pavement in low-wealth neighbourhoods, as the mean number
of visible trash pieces was strongly correlated to the wealth of the neighbourhood. The
strong negative effect of direct requests in low-wealth neighbourhoods instead might
stem from the feelings of distrust and individualism found in these areas (Laurence &
Heath, 2008), or from personal characteristics of individuals linked to the environment.
Of particular relevance are the results of experimental studies that show the emergence
of antisocial behaviour in resource scarcity (e.g. Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Gardner
& West, 2004; Lynch et al., 1997; Prediger et al., 2014; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001; Zizzo,
2003). Spiteful and antisocial behaviour are considered evolutionarily beneficial in
periods of scarcity because they increase the perpetrator's fitness relatively to the
harmed competitor. In example, using the 'joy-of-destruction' game (Abbink & Herrmann,
2011), Prediger et al. (2014) find evidence for a strong positive relationship between
scarcity of natural resources and spite. In this one-shot game, two players are given
equal endowments and they can decide to sacrifice part of their endowment in order to
lower the other players' payoff below its own (the 'money destruction' option). There is
no monetary gain in money destruction. Prediger et al. (2014) conducted this game with
pastorals in Namibia from two areas of different productivity and found evidence for a
strong positive relationship between scarcity of natural resources and willingness to
reduce another inhabitant's endowment at their own cost. It is suggested that the greater
scarcity leads to greater competitive pressure and spiteful behaviour between
individuals. It is possible that the lower return rates of letters, as well as the lower help
rates for the dropped item and the jaywalking experiments, found in poor
neighbourhoods rather than rich neighbourhoods, are underpinned by the greater
competitive pressure present in resource scarcity. 
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For the charity experiment, direct and indirect requests had a strong effect on charity
donations. Independently of urbanicity, direct requests were more than twice as likely
than indirect requests to elicit a donation. These results are in accordance with results in
the helping literature (Darley & Latane, 1968; Goldman et al., 1983) and the absence of
the effect in the dropped item experiment is surprising. In contrast with my expectations,
I also recorded higher helping from lone individuals than from individuals in groups. I
expected individuals in a group to help/donate more than lone individuals as the
presence of others would create the opportunity for reputation and reciprocity (West et
al., 2007). Nevertheless, it is possible that single individuals were more prone to help
than individuals in groups because no diffusion of responsibility (Clark & Word, 1974)
between group members was possible. In particular, the diffusion of responsibility is
used as a possible explanation for the bystander effect, suggesting that bystanders
avoid helping when they believe someone else could or is providing assistance (Darley
& Latane, 1968). Another explanation could be that in anonymity and de-
individualisation, increase normative behaviour (Reicher, 1984). Under this
circumstance, individuals would behave following what is believed the social norm of
behaviour rather than following personal preference (Reicher, 1984; Wright et al., 1990).
In particular, individuals in social groups experience a greater sense of social identity
and are more likely to follow the group behaviour. Moreover, small-group membership is
valued more in de-individualisation, suggesting that de-individualisation and group size
interact in determining identification in social groups (Brewer, 1991; 1993; Reicher et al.,
1995). 
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5.6 Supporting material
5.6.1 Key characteristics of neighbourhoods selected 
Note: Urbanicity refers to the size of the settlement in which the neighbourhood is found, whereas population size refers to the population size of the neighbourhood
(LSOA). Scottish neighbourhoods are based on two DZs. Wealth variable is determined from the national IMD, Income, Employment and Crime deciles.
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Urbanicity Wealth LSOA code IMD decile Income Employment Crime Population
decile  decile  decile size
Redruth town low E01018911 2 2 2 1 1,656
Middlewich town high E01018424 8 8 7 6 1,773
Abercynon town low W01001144 1 1 1 1 1,652
Hawick town low S01012360&2 1 1 2 1 884
Polesworth town high E01031038 7 6 6 8 2,025
Wombourne town high E01029675 9 8 6 6 1,495
Jaywick Clacton-on-Sea town low E01021968 1 1 1 1 1,830
Camborne town low E01018871 4 5 4 4 1,647
Saffron Walden town high E01022076 9 7 8 8 1,772
Radstock town low E01014469 4 5 5 7 1,380
St. Andrews town high S01009730&29 10 8 10 10 1,180
Helensburgh town high S01007388&92 10 10 10 9 1,157
Helensburgh East town low S01007398&9 2 2 2 4 1,255
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Urbanicity Wealth LSOA code IMD decile Income Employment Crime Population
decile  decile  decile size
Liverpool Cosby city high E01006938 8 8 7 9 1,249
Liverpool Toxteth city low E01006632 1 1 1 5 1,888
Glasgow Partick city high S01010400&02 10 9 10 10 2,161
Glasgow Carlton city low S01010037&8 1 1 1 1 1,669
Bristol Clifton city high E01014544 8 10 10 8 1,631
Bristol Ashton city low E01014501 3 3 3 5 1,927
Cardiff Pontcanna city high W01001714 10 9 10 6 1,550
Cardiff Adamstown Splott city low W01001696 1 1 1 1 1,595
Leeds Adel city high E01011383 7 6 6 5 1,581
Leeds Beeston city low E01011369 3 2 4 2 1,632
Newcastle Gosforth city high E01008355 10 8 9 10 1,555
Newcastle Walker city low E01008426 1 1 1 5 1,614
Edinbourgh Murrayfield city high S01008883&2 10 10 10 3 1,745
Edinbourgh Leith city low S01008777&6 1 2 1 2 1,947
Manchester Chorlton city high E01005152 7 8 8 3 1,419
Manchester Harpurhey city low E01005203 1 1 1 1 2,052
Sheffield Hallam city high E01032585 8 8 8 10 2,178
Shaffield Parkhill Manor city low E01007881 2 2 2 2 1,618
Birmingham Harborne city high E01009077 3 4 3 5 1,809
Birmingham Aston city low E01008901 1 1 1 3 1,773
Plymouth Elburton city high E01015127 7 6 5 8 1,514
Plymouth Stonehouse city low E01015155 1 1 1 1 1,882
Nottingham Beeston city high E01013892 7 7 4 8 1,392
Nottingham Bilborough city low E01013859 1 2 1 4 1,471
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5.6.2 Results of observations and transects: Average values for the variables collected during observations and transects in each neighbourhood.
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Urbanicity Wealth Average Average Average Average
Cars Trash People Pace
Liverpool Cosby city high 112 11 12.2 6.36
Liverpool Toxteth city low 133 32 67.5 6.58
Glasgow Partick city high 132 1 21.4 6.09
Glasgow Carlton city low 91 104.5 52 6.67
Bristol Clifton city high 115.7 7 48 6.46
Bristol Ashton city low 182.5 6.2 60 7.01
Cardiff Pontcanna city high 62.5 15 34.7 6.33
Cardiff Adamstown Splott city low 149 6 27 6.3
Leeds Adel city high 143 2.45 30 7
Leeds Beeston city low 62.7 3 8.33 6.05
Newcastle Gosforth city high 71 3.7 15 6.41
Newcastle Walker city low 54 2.5 23 5.5
Edinbourgh Murrayfield city high 162 39 37.5 5.58
Edinbourgh Leith city low 132 1 21.4 6.09
Manchester Chorlton city high 89 17 32.4 6.47
Manchester Harpurhey city low 74.5 5 53 6.35
Sheffield Hallam city high 58.75 24.5 16 6.23
Shaffield Parkhill Manor city low 101 7.5 NA 6.92
Birmingham Harborne city high 53.25 16.5 17 6.57
Birmingham Aston city low 108 12.5 19 6.3
Plymouth Elburton city high 157 3 45 7.31
Plymouth Stonehouse city low 143 18 48 6.48
Nottingham Beeston city high 54.7 12 36 6.41
Nottingham Bilborough city low 106.7 11.5 32.5 6.6
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Urbanicity Wealth Average Average Average Average
Cars Trash People Pace
Redruth town low 40.7 4 65 6.44
Middlewich town high 71 3.7 15 6.41
Abercynon town low 42 7 7 6.33
Hawick town low 53 7.2 12 7.04
Polesworth town high 93 4 3.5 6.15
Wombourne town high 71.5 4 8 6.05
Jaywick Clacton-on-Sea town low 163 4 34 5.21
Camborne town low 127.4 12 36 6.51
Saffron Walden town high 40.7 4 65 6.44
Radstock town low 50.5 5 7.5 6.05
St. Andrews town high 67.5 3.33 68 6.38
Helensburgh town high 48.5 1.5 20 6.21
Helensburgh East town low 98 4.33 18 6.35
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Discussion 
6.1 Overview and general results
Human cooperative tendency qualitatively exceeds that of any other species; we
extensively cooperate with non-relatives that we are unlikely to meet again, thus in
situations that provide little opportunity for reciprocity or reputation building. Cooperation
also varies greatly depending on the environmental contexts. In particular, there is a
widespread view that city life is linked with lower cooperative tendency than life in rural
settings. This view has found empirical support in various studies (e.g. Korte, 1980;
Amato, 1983; Steblay, 1987; Levine et al., 1994; 2008). 
In this thesis, I investigated cooperation levels across different urban scales in different
experimental contexts. I studied the effects of city-living on generosity in a dictator game
and in self-reported measures of cooperation; the effects of city-living on trust and
trustworthiness; and the effects of city-living on four real-world help measures as well as
the features of city-life that affect cooperative behaviour. I aimed at understanding
whether urban-rural differences in cooperative tendency existed and if these were
consistent across different contexts and forms of helping. Moreover, I tested whether
urban-rural variation in cooperation can be explained by differences in trust levels,
stimuli load, anonymity, or a general diffusion of responsibility. 
6.1.1 Urban residence effects on generosity
I used a dictator game and two self-report measures of cooperative behaviour to
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investigate how urbanicity influences pro-sociality. I also controlled whether behaviour in
the dictator game correlates with results from self-reported measures of cooperative
behaviour in the real world. I used donations in the dictator game as proxy for generosity
(Kahneman et al., 1986), and self-report measures' results as proxy for the levels of pro-
sociality. Self-report measures asked to rate statements about self-perceived generosity
(Rushton et al., 1982) or statements on the frequency in which one engages in prosocial
activities (Smith & Hill, 2009). Based on the literature, my predictions were that city-
dwellers would be less generous than town-dwellers. I also predicted that results from
the dictator game and scores from the self-report measures would be correlated, with
city-dwellers reporting fewer real-world cooperative acts than town-dwellers. 
Counter to the predictions, urbanicity did not affect generosity in the dictator game or in
the self-reported measures of cooperative behaviour. In this study, I found no support for
the hypothesis that city-life is associated with lower cooperative tendency (e.g. Amato,
1983; Levine et al., 1994; Levine et al., 2008). On the other hand, results showed a
positive correlation between self-report measures of cooperative behaviour and
donations in a dictator game, adding to the evidence that decisions made in economic
games and the self-report measures of moral values are positively correlated
(Peysakhovich et al., 2014). 
6.1.2 Urban residence effects on trust and trustworthiness
A growing body of evidence from different fields suggest a negative role of city life on
trust and cooperation (Anderson & Jane, 2011; Balliet et al., 2014; Dye, 2008; Gächter
et al., 2004; Peen et al., 2010; Lederbogen et al., 2013; Lederbogen et al., 2011). In
particular, city-dwellers are found to experience higher stress and anxiety levels via
amygdala activation (Lederbogen et al., 2011). For example, Lederbogen and
109
Chapter 6. Discussion
colleagues (2011) showed that amygdala activity during social stress was stronger in
city-dwellers than town-dwellers and suggested that the exposure to the socially
stressful environment of cities over long periods of time would increase the risk of
depression, chronic stress and anxiety, and coronary heart disease. The amygdala is
required for a normal social cognition, and modulates fear responses (Adolphs &
Spezio, 2006; LeDoux, 2000). Moreover, it affects facial processing, which can lead to
reduced trust in others in situations of high social stimuli. In fact, an impaired amygdala
response can make it difficult to interpret others' intentions (Adolphs & Spezio, 2006). As
a consequence, lower trust levels in others reduce cooperation, as people are less
inclined to invest in a cooperative exchange (House & Wolf, 1978). 
I used a trust game (Berg et al., 1995) to investigate the effects of urbanicity on trust and
trustworthiness. I expected city-dwellers to be generally less trusting and thus to keep
more of the endowment than town-dwellers. Moreover, I expected city-dwellers to be
less trustworthy and send back less money than town-dwellers regardless of where their
interaction partner was from. In this experiment, I found a strong negative effect of
urbanicity on the amount investors sent, thus adding evidence to a growing body of
research showing that city life negatively affects trust towards strangers (e.g. Adolphs &
Spezio, 2006; Balliet et al., 2014; Lederbogen et al., 2011; Gächter et al., 2004). In
addition, I found that city-dwellers were as trusting towards other city dwellers as
towards town dwellers, which demonstrates that the place of residence of the trustee
was not used as a clue of trustworthiness. Trustworthiness, on the other hand, was not
affected by urbanicity. City-dwellers were as trustworthy as town-dwellers, which
contradicts the hypothesis that city life is associated with lower cooperative tendency. 
The explanation for these results may be found in the fact that trust in others is affected
by amygdala activity under stressful social stimuli of cities compared to towns (Adolphs
110
Chapter 6. Discussion
& Spezio, 2006), whereas trustworthiness stems from moral cognition rather than social
cognition, thus the amygdala only plays a marginal role in this. Cortical regions of the
prefrontal cortex and temporal lobes modulate moral cognition (Moll et al., 2003; 2005).
This could explain why trust, but not trustworthiness, is affected by the environmental
condition. 
6.1.3 Urban residence effects on four help measures
I ran four real-world experiments in 36 neighbourhoods of cities and towns across the
UK. I used  'lost letter', 'dropped item', 'jaywalking', and 'charity donations' experiments
to test whether city-dwellers were less pro-social than town-dwellers across different
forms of helping and, if so, to test what explains this urban-rural variation. In particular, I
investigated whether “psychological overload”, “diffusion of responsibility” or  “perceived
anonymity” often experienced in cities were responsible for lower levels of pro-sociality
found in cities. Based on the literature, I predicted that people would help more in towns
than in cities, and I expected higher help levels when people were directly approached
for help (i.e. no bystander effect), and when asked to help in the presence of their social
group (i.e. no anonymity). Moreover, I controlled for the effects of SES of the
neighbourhood and its effect on cooperation. I predicted that help would be higher in
high-wealth neighbourhoods than low-wealth neighbourhoods. 
Results from the field experiments showed no evidence that city-living is associated with
lower pro-sociality. In all four experiments, city-dwellers were as likely as town dwellers
to help. Interestingly, no significant differences were found between cities and towns in
the most commonly used measures of load (Amato, 1983; Levine et al., 1994; 2008)
when measured at the neighbourhood level. Moreover, direct help requests were
generally associated with higher help rates, whereas the presence of a social group did
not elicit helping. The main predictor of help was wealth of the neighbourhood for all
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help measures. This finding adds to the evidence that socio-economic factors play an
important role in shaping human behaviour (e.g. Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Korndorfer et
al., 2014; Pepper & Nettle, 2017). I suggest that the absence of urban-rural variation in
cooperation levels may stem from to the different level of analysis used in this study
compared to previous ones (i.e. neighbourhood wealth analysis versus city/town wealth
analysis). I argue that cities have a wider range of wealth within compared to towns
(Pateman, 2011), hence an overall city/town wealth analysis would have led to
misleading results regarding the link between urbanicity and cooperation.  
6.2 Methodological considerations
6.2.1 Reliability of AMT 
I used a dual approach of laboratory and field studies for a comprehensive look at
urban-rural variation in cooperative behaviour. In both approaches, I found no evidence
of urban-rural differences in cooperation: city-dwellers were as generous (Chapter 3),
trustworthy (Chapter 4), and helpful (Chapter 5) as town-dwellers. In addition, I found
that donations in the dictator game were correlated with self-report measures of
generosity. Altogether, these results would suggest a strong reliability of AMT for the
study of human behaviour, and add support to an ongoing discussion on the
generalisation of results drawn from this medium (Chandler et al., 2013; Ipeirotis, 2010;
Rand, 2012).  
Nevertheless, it could be argued that AMT was not able to detect any influence of SES
on cooperation. Indeed, in the AMT studies, workers were asked to provide information
on their average annual income, and this was not predictive of choices in lab games or
of results in self-report measures. Income, however, is arguably descriptive of the socio-
economic situation in which workers are living. In particular, to define wealth in the real-
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world experiments I used the IMD, which is a multi-dimensional index composed of
different domains relevant to deprivation (i.e. employment, income, health, education,
services, crime; Payne & Abel, 2012). It is possible that the deprivation situation lived by
subjects in real-world experiments is more significant than the information on personal
income given by workers on AMT. In this study, only information on the urbanicity of the
place of residence was gathered. It would be interesting to test the effectiveness of AMT
using the same neighbourhood level of analysis used in the filed experiments (i.e.
asking workers to provide a ZIP code and gathering information on the neighbourhood
from US census). 
6.2.2 Field experiments
The major concern about methodology in the field experiments is regarding the charity
collections. Of the four help measures used in the field experiments, the charity
collections were the only ones carried out in city and town centres instead of
neighbourhoods. Even in this context, I found no effect of urbanicity on cooperation,
although it should have been expected based on previous work which is also mainly
conducted in central areas of cities and towns (e.g. Amato, 1983; Levine et al., 1994). I
argue that, unfortunately, the procedure prevented me from creating a realistic setting
for the experiment. I believe that indirect and general requests for a donation were
perceived as unnatural and this perception was promoted further by the presence of a
single collector (personal observation). This belief is supported by the few instances in
which I have been directly questioned about my work during collections. It is possible
that small towns' donations were affected more than cities' donations, leading to lower
than normal cooperation in town centres in this study. 
On another note, the methodological approach used to test direct and indirect requests
in the lost letter experiment generated interesting results. On one hand, direct requests
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(i.e. letters left on windscreens) were more likely to be successful, in line with results
from other studies (Darley & Latane, 1968; Goldman et al., 1983). This would suggest
that the approach is sound. On the other hand, direct requests also had the opposite
effect when carried out in deprived neighbourhoods, which requires an explanation that
deviates from the diffusion of responsibility literature. This result can be better explained
considering the evidence that shows the emergence of antisocial behaviour in situation
of deprivation (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Gardner & West, 2004; Lynch et al., 1997;
Nettle et al., 2011). In this scenario, individuals would be more prone to discard the letter
found in deprived neighbourhoods as an act of antisocial behaviour (e.g. simple littering)
stemming from the environmental conditions they live in. 
6.3 Cities and cooperation 
The most striking result constant throughout this study is that city-dwellers are as
cooperative as town dwellers, which is in contrast with previous theories and empirical
studies (see Korte, 1978; Steblay, 1987 for reviews). Theoretically, this result fits Gans'
idea (1962; 1967) that city-life per se has no actual impact on social behaviour. Gans
argues that factors independent from urbanicity, such as individual's age, ethnicity or
SES, shape pro-social responses.  Therefore, factors such as overload, population size
and density, generally associated with urbanicity, have no direct influence on pro-
sociality. Gans suggests that the only possibility to find urban-rural differences is if urban
and rural populations differ in their social traits – if, for example,  the urban population is
constituted by mainly working-class individuals and the rural by mainly middle-class
individuals. 
Here, I argue that the urban population does differ from the rural population in the way
that it experiences a wider range of deprivation. I also argue that this difference has
erroneously led to the belief that urbanicity was causing the reduction in cooperation
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levels. Instead, deprivation, which is linked to urbanicity, affects cooperation. Instances
like this happen when a factor of confusion (i.e. deprivation) acts on both the 'cause' (i.e.
urbanicity) and the 'effect' (i.e. cooperation) under study (Simpson's paradox: Simpson,
1951; Blyth, 1972; Wagner, 1982). A solution to the problem is to identify the factor of
confusion and study it apart. 
In this study, I looked at deprivation separately and found that it affects cooperation
directly. Moreover, I showed that urbanicity and deprivation are linked, as cities are
found to have a wider range of deprivation compared to towns (Pateman, 2011). Thus,
previous studies finding urban-rural variation in cooperation when looking at an overall
city/town level of deprivation analysis might be explained under this light. The real cause
of decreased cooperation (i.e. deprivation) might have been concealed by the
misleading results. 
6.4 Deprivation and cooperation
The strongest result from the field experiments was that cooperation was negatively
affected by deprivation levels of the neighbourhood. I found that in high-wealth
neighbourhoods people were more likely to post a lost letter, to return a dropped item
and to allow a pedestrian to cross the road, than low-wealth neighbourhoods.
Interestingly, none of these help measures implies a direct financial cost to the helper.
This result is in line with several recent studies that show the impact of socio-economic
factors on human behaviour and cognition (e.g. Frankenhuis et al., 2016;  Pepper &
Nettle, 2017). 
For example, in conditions of deprivation, trust and cooperation are hindered (Falk et al.,
2015; Hill et al., 2014) and antisocial behaviour is more likely to emerge (Brunnschweiler
& Bulte, 2009; Gardner & West, 2004; Prediger et al., 2014). Moreover, in deprived
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compared to advantaged conditions, there is a tendency to invest less money and
energy in education and child rearing (Blanden & Gregg, 2004; Hango, 2007; Sirin,
2005) as well as in health-related behaviours (Brennan et al., 2009; Mobley et al., 2006;
Mackenbach et al., 2008; Nettle, 2010; White et al., 2009); people tend to have children
sooner (Nettle, 2010; Smith, 1993); and they are more likely to use drugs, smoke, and
drink alcohol (Mackenbach et al., 2008; Melotti et al., 2011; Legleye et al., 2011;
Schroeder & Hoffman, 2014).  
These changes in behaviour can be explained by future discounting and the preference
for present rewards that arise in such deprived conditions (Frankenhuis et al., 2016).
Indeed, people experiencing socio-economic limitations are generally more impulsive
and risk-prone, more pessimistic about the future and more present-oriented than
people in socio-economic prosperity (Adams & White, 2006; Hill et al.; 1997; Hill et al.,
2014; Daly & Wilson, 2005; Pepper & Nettle, 2017). These cognitive biases are
considered an adaptation to harsh and unpredictable environments, as in these
circumstances future rewards are less likely to be gained (Frankenhuis et al., 2013;
Frankenhuis et al., 2016; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014) and thus people are less willing to
delay any possible compensation. 
In particular, according to life history theory, living in harsh environments triggers a
switch to a short life history strategy, leading to lower investments in the long-term in
health, in reproductive strategy, as well as in investment in offspring. For example, under
this framework, Pepper & Nettle (2013) theorised and tested the idea that the cue given
by the environment was leading to future and delay discounting. They found that the
strongest association with future discounting was bereavements, and, more importantly,
they found a SES gradient in perceived mortality risk as being beyond control, which in
turn led to fatalistic behaviour. Moreover, the impact of future discounting on cooperation
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can be seen in a Prisoner's Dilemma game (Luce & Raïffa, 1957). The iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma is considered to be an experimental test of the discounting problem
(Daly & Wilson, 2005; Stephens et al., 2002; Stevens & Hauser, 2004). Players can
choose between the short-term reward of defecting or the long-term reward of
cooperating. Studies show that discounting correlates with cooperation with individuals
who highly devalue future rewards being less likely to cooperate. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies also report the opposite effect of deprivation on
cooperation (Cote et al., 2012; Kraus et al., 2010; Kraus et al., 2011; Piff et al., 2010; Piff
et al., 2012). In particular, Piff et al. (2010; 2012) theorise that lower class individuals are
more pro-social than their high-wealth counterparts because they relay on others for
their future to a greater degree. Despite the value of these studies, a number of
methodological differences may explain the opposite results. Firstly, Piff et al. use
laboratory or online experiments rather than field studies; secondly, they extensively use
a student sample, which is arguably representative of the overall population; moreover,
the socio-economic status is mostly self-reported, or is a perceived status in an
experimentally manipulated ranking. All these differences in the experimental setup are
likely to produce different results.   
In conclusion, results from the present support the findings that deprivation hinders
cooperation. This link between SES and lower cooperation levels is of extreme
relevance in today's world, where we face global challenges for which we need a
cooperative effort (e.g. O'Brien & Leichenko, 2000) on one hand, and on the other hand,
urbanisation and inequality are raising rapidly (Aldonas, 2007). 
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6.5 Urbanisation and inequality
Urbanisation mostly consists of poor people migrating to cities in search for new job
opportunities (Zopf, 2017). In poorer countries, this migratory trend expected to continue
(UN DESA, 2016), nevertheless cities of developing countries are struggling to cope
with both the speed and the scale of this migration. It is unlikely that urbanisation will
translate in wellbeing for the population (Beall et al., 2011; Muggah, 2014), as suggested
by the evidence that already today the vast majority of the urban population of
developing countries live in slums. These issues have raised awareness for the
necessity of policies aimed at controlling urbanisation and creating a liveable urban
environment (UN DESA, 2016; Zopf, 2017). 
Objectives of these policies are mainly: 1) to slow down the pace of migration from rural
to urban environments by enhancing rural livelihoods; 2) involving local people; and 3)
improving the liveability of cities. It is debated whether enhancing rural development
could actually slow the pace of urbanisation, as well as whether rural environments
could actually sustain a bigger population (UK DFID, 2017; “Urbanisation: The Brown
Revolution”, 2002). Moreover, most countries have a rural development policy in place,
but not many have an urban policy (UK DFID, 2017). Whereas population involvement
as proven to be an essential step in promoting social cohesion, trust in others as well as
in policy-makers, and relief from the perceived anonymity (Muggah, 2012; UK DFID,
2017; Parkinson et al., 2006). This, in turn, would lead to the improved liveability of
cities. 
Evidence can be found in the success of organisations such as Slumdwellers
International (SDI; http://skoll.org/organization/slum-dwellers-international/). SDI is a
network of community-based organisations of people living in slums in over 30 countries
118
Chapter 6. Discussion
of Africa, Asia and South America. It was created to give local initiatives more voice by
'joining forces' with other realities and to help to influence governments to implement
their urban development scheme. These organisations provide invaluable information
and data on local needs, and can pressure authorities to address them. It is no surprise
then that the UN DESA (2016) suggests handling more power over to local authorities
and local people as a vital part of a positive urbanisation process. 
6.5.1 UK policies
Also in the UK policies addressed at improving the state of cities are improving.
Targeted interventions on unemployment, crime, education and health have enhanced
liveability in the most deprived urban neighbourhoods (Parkinson et al., 2006). In
particular, following policies implementations, there have been significant improvements
in the quality of housing, and in the incidence of certain typologies of crime. However,
incidence of robbery and of violent crime, as well as poor health, remain high in deprived
urban areas. Crime policies are particularly important in the urban setting, as crime rates
are higher in urban than rural environments and particularly in the most deprived areas
of urban environments (Parkinson et al., 2006). Government measures against crime
(i.e. Neighbourhood Wardens and the Street Crime Initiative) had a positive effect in the
last decade, and it seems that promoting social responsibility could – once again – be
fundamental in the developmental success of the areas. On a local level, for example,
the most successful areas have been those that worked on creating social cohesion.
Policies were aimed at enhancing community involvement and identity, to help
inhabitants in accessing the job market, and to increment work opportunities (Parkinson
et al., 2006). Thus, it appears of primary importance to raise awareness and
involvement in local administration. 
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6.6 Conclusion
This work makes a substantial contribution to the urban-rural literature and to the field of
human cooperation. Here, I showed evidence against the common belief that city-
dwellers are less cooperative than town-dwellers, and argued that this variation may be
a by-product of the association between urbanicity and deprivation. Moreover, I add
experimental evidence to the research on the negative impacts of deprivation on
behaviour. 
6.6.1 Future work
Results from this study suggest a strong influence of SES on pro-sociality, probably via
shifted priorities (i.e. future discounting). Also economic inequality, often linked to
urbanicity, influences behaviour, with higher risk taking behaviours in increased
inequality (Payne et al., 2017). All this raises the question of whether the current
interventions aimed at growing participation in public and community cooperation, which
are believed to be of critical importance in improving the conditions of the urban
deprived (Section 6.5), are effective homogeneously among the population and, if not,
how they can be implemented. For example, the commonly used nudges (Thaler &
Sustein, 2009; Raihani, 2013) might not have the desired effect when individuals are
immersed in an environmental condition that triggers fatalistic behaviours, as they do not
offer short-term benefits. An interesting direction for future work could aim at clarifying
the behavioural consequences of living in harsh environmental conditions, at discerning
the separate impacts of different SES factors on cooperative behaviour, and at better
understanding how the common interventions are perceived between individuals of
different environmental backgrounds (Jung & Data, 2016). The outcome could lead to
the creation of more effective interventions, giving a vital new tool for policy makers. 
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A) Instructions for the Dictator Game 
Dictators
WELCOME! 
 
To enter, please provide here your worker ID
 
 
 
Note that your worker ID is needed to ensure you get your bonus.
 
If you don't remember your worker ID you can find it out opening this link in a new
window:
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard 
- - - - -
Thank you, you are now ready to start the game!
 
 
 ** GAME INSTRUCTIONS ** 
 
You are Player 1
 
You have been allocated a bonus of $1.00.
You can choose how much of this bonus to give to Player 2.
 
Your worker ID and Player 2's worker ID will remain anonymous. 
 - - - - -
First, please answer two questions correctly to ensure your HIT is accepted.  
 
1. You have a bonus of $1.00. If you decided to send $0.10 to Player 2, your bonus would
be:
 
 
$0.10  
$0.40  
$0.90  
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- - - - - 
2. If you decided to send to Player 2 $0.90, your bonus would be:
 
$0.10  
$0.40  
$0.90   
- - - - -
Well done! You answered the questions correctly.
 
  
You have been allocated a bonus of $1.00!
 
 You can choose to send any of this bonus to Player 2.
Player 2 won't find out your Worker ID and you won't know the Worker ID of Player 2.
- - - - -
 
How much would you like to send to Player 2?
Please indicate your choice below. 
 
YOU WILL KEEP PLAYER 2 WILL GET PLEASE CHOOSE ONE
$ 0.00 $ 1.00
$ 0.10 $ 0.90
$ 0.20 $ 0.80
$ 0.30 $ 0.70
$ 0.40 $ 0.60
$ 0.50 $ 0.50
$ 0.60 $ 0.40
$ 0.70 $ 0.30
$ 0.80 $ 0.20
$ 0.90 $ 0.10
$ 1.00 $ 0.00
- - - - -
You have successfully transferred the money!
- - - - - 
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Before completing the HIT, please answer the following six questions.
 
 
1. What is your gender? 
 
2. What is your age?
 
3. What is your approximate annual income?
4. Where do you currently live? 
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey)
 
5. Where did you grow up? 
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey) 
 
6. For most of your life, you lived in:
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey)  
 
- - - - -
 
That is the end of the game!
 
To complete the HIT and ensure it will be accepted please enter your mystery word
below in the box on the Mechanical Turk tab before submitting.
 
Your mystery word is:
BOOK
 
Thank you for completing the game!
 
Have you copied your mystery word?!
Then tick 'EXIT' to leave the game. 
 
EXIT 
- - - - -
Thank you for taking our survey. 
- - - - - - - - - -
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B) Instructions for Questionnaire 
WELCOME!  
To enter, please provide here your worker ID
 
  
Note that your worker ID is needed to ensure you get your bonus.
 
If you don't remember your worker ID you can find it out opening this link in a new
window: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard 
- - - - -
Welcome! 
Please take a moment to read over this description of the survey you are about to take.
When you are ready to proceed, click "Next".
You are being asked to participate in a survey. The questions are about how you respond 
in day to day situations. You are eligible to participate in this study if you are at least 18 
years of age. There are no right or wrong answers and all responses are anonymous. 
NOTE - This survey may require 5-7 minutes to complete. For this you will be awarded a
$0.40 bonus to be added to your $0.20 participation fee.
You will earn a total of $0.60 for completing the survey.  
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At the end of the survey you will find the mystery word to enter on the Mechanical Turk
tab before submitting your HIT - you will only receive the payment if you complete the
whole survey and provide the mystery word. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or discontinue your 
involvement at any time. The survey results will be stored on a secure server and you 
should not put your name or any identifying personal information on the questionnaire.
- - - - -
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
You will now see a number of statements that may or may not describe you. 
Please indicate how much each statement describes you. 
- - - - -
I am known by family and friends as someone who makes time to pay attention to others’
problems.
Does not describe me at all
Describes me poorly
Somewhat describes me
Generally describes me
Describes me well
Describes me greatly 
When it comes to my personal relationship with others, I am a very generous person.
 
It makes me very happy to give to other people in ways that meet their needs. 
It is just as important to me that other people around me are happy and thriving as it is 
that I am happy and thriving.
 
I am usually willing to make personal sacrifices if I stand a chance of helping someone 
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else in need.
My decisions are often based on concern for the welfare of others.
- - - - -
You will now see a list of acts. 
Please, check the category that conforms to the frequency with which you have carried
out these acts. 
- - - - -
Please, only select NA if you have never encountered the situation (e.g. you never met
someone who needed help pushing their car) or can not carry out the action listed (e.g.
you can not donate blood). 
 Never Once More than once Often Very often NA
I have helped push a stranger's broken car. 
I have given money to charity. 
I have given money to homeless people. 
I have made change for a stranger. 
I have given directions to a stranger. 
I have donated blood. 
I have donated goods or cloths to a charity. 
I have done volunteer work for a charity. 
I have held the door open for a stranger. 
I have allowed someone to go ahead in a queue. 
I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (i.e. luggage, prams)
I have pointed out a clerk's error in undercharging me for an item. 
I have given a stranger a lift in my car. 
I have looked after a neighbour's pets or children without being paid for it. 
I have let a neighbour whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some value to me 
(ie. a dish, tools)
I have bought "charity" Christmas cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause
I have helped an acquaintance to move house. 
I have offered my seat on a bus/train to a stranger. 
I have helped a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street. 
- - - - -
Thank you for completing this survey!
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To complete the HIT and ensure it will be accepted please enter your mystery word
below in the box on the Mechanical Turk tab before submitting.
 
Your mystery word is:
NOVEL
 
Thank you for completing the game!
 
Have you copied your mystery word?!
Then tick 'EXIT' to leave the game. 
  
EXIT  
- - - - -
Thank you for taking our survey. 
- - - - - - - - - -
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Supplementary Figure 1. Screenshot of Player's 1 (investor) choice in the Trust Game.
Investors were asked to choose how much of their endowment they wanted to send to
the other Player (from $0.00 to $0.50, in $0.05 increments). Note: the highlighted text
informs the residence of the other Player. In the condition where the residence is the
same, in the highlighted box appears the copied and pasted text entry that the Player
gave when answering where they were from. 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Screenshot of Player's 2 (trustee) choice in the Trust Game.
Trustees were asked to choose how much of the endowment received they wanted to
send back to the investor (from $0.00 to $0.45 or $1.05 depending on the condition, in
$0.05 increments). 
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Instructions for the Trust Game
Investors
WELCOME!
 
To enter, please provide your worker ID here
 
 
 
Note that your worker ID is needed to ensure that you get your bonus.
 
If you don't remember your worker ID you can find it out by opening this link in a new tab
or window:
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard
- - - - - 
Thank you, you are now ready to start the game!
** GAME INSTRUCTIONS **
You are Player 1
Both you and Player 2 have been allocated a $0.50 bonus.
You have the opportunity to send some, all, or none of 
your $0.50 bonus to Player 2.
Whatever amount you decide to send will be tripled before reaching the other player.
Player 2 will then decide how much money to send back to you 
and how much money to keep.
Your worker ID and Player 2's worker ID will remain anonymous.
- - - - - 
First, please answer two questions correctly to ensure your HIT is accepted. 
 
1. If you decided to send $0.10 to Player 2, how much will she/he receive? 
 
$0.10  
$0.30  
$1.20 
- - - - - 
2. If you decided to send $0.40 to Player 2, how much will she/he receive? 
 
$0.10  
$0.30  
$1.20 
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- - - - - 
Well done! You answered the comprehension questions correctly. 
 
To proceed, please tell us where do you currently live? 
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey) 
- - - - - 
You have been allocated $0.50!
You can choose to send any amount of this bonus to Player 2.
Remember: the amount sent will be tripled before reaching the other player. Player 2 will
then decide how much money to send back to you.  
Player 2 won't find out your Worker ID and you won't know the Worker ID of Player 2.
- - - - - 
Player 2 is from:
DALLAS, TEXAS 
How much would you like to send to Player 2?
 Please indicate your choice below. 
 
YOU WILL SEND PLAYER 2 WILL GET   PLEASE CHOOSE ONE
$ 0.00 $ 0.00
$ 0.05 $ 0.15
$ 0.10 $ 0.30
$ 0.15 $ 0.45
$ 0.20 $ 0.60
$ 0.25 $ 0.75
$ 0.30 $ 0.90
$ 0.35 $ 1.05
$ 0.40 $ 1.20
$ 0.45 $ 1.35
$ 0.50 $ 1.50
- - - - - 
You have successfully transferred the money!
 
Before completing the HIT, please answer the following five questions.
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1. What is your gender?
 
2. What is your age?
 
3. What is your approximate annual income? 
 
4. Where did you grow up?
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey) 
 
5. How much money do you expect to receive from Player 1? 
(e.g. $0.00; $1.50)
 $  
 
- - - - - 
That was the end of the game!
 
To complete the HIT and ensure it will be accepted please enter your mystery word
below in the box on the Mechanical Turk tab before submitting.
 
Your mystery word is:
 TREE
 
Thank you for completing the game!
 
Have you copied your mystery word?!
Then tick 'EXIT' to leave the game.
EXIT  
- - - - - 
Thank you for taking our survey. 
- - - - - - - - - - 
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Trustees 
WELCOME!
 
To enter, please provide your worker ID here
 
 
 
Note that your worker ID is needed to ensure that you get your bonus.
 
If you don't remember your worker ID you can find it out by opening this link in a new tab
or window:
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/dashboard
- - - - - 
 
Thank you, you are now ready to start the game!
 
 ** GAME INSTRUCTIONS ** 
 
You are Player 2
 
Both you and Player 1 have been allocated a $0.50 bonus. 
 
Player 1 has the opportunity to send some, all, or none of
her/his $0.50 bonus to you.
 Whatever amount Player 1 decides to send will be tripled before reaching you. 
 
  You will then decide how much money to send back to Player 1
and how much money to keep.
 
Your worker ID and Player 2's worker ID will remain anonymous. 
- - - - - 
First, please answer two questions correctly to ensure your HIT is accepted. 
 
1. If Player 1 decided to send $0.10 to you, how much will you receive?  
$0.10  
$0.30  
$1.20  
- - - - - 
2. If Player 1 decided to send $0.40 to you, how much will you receive? 
$0.10  
$0.30  
$1.20   
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- - - - - 
Well done! You answered the comprehension questions correctly. 
 
To proceed, please tell us where do you currently live? 
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey) 
- - - - - 
You have been allocated $0.50!
Player 1 can choose to send any amount of her/his $0.50 bonus to you.
Remember: the amount sent will be tripled before reaching you. You will then decide
how much money to send back to Player 1. 
Player 2 won't find out your Worker ID and you won't know the Worker ID of Player 2. 
- - - - - 
Player 1 is from:
DALLAS, TEXAS 
And she/he has sent you:  $0.15
Which means you have received:  $0.45  
How much of the $0.45 received do you want to send back to Player 1?
Please indicate your choice below. 
YOU WILL SEND YOU WILL KEEP PLEASE CHOOSE ONE
$ 0.00 $ 0.45
$ 0.05 $ 0.40
$ 0.10 $ 0.35
$ 0.15 $ 0.30
$ 0.20 $ 0.25
$ 0.25 $ 0.20
$ 0.30 $ 0.15
$ 0.35 $ 0.10
$ 0.40 $ 0.05
$ 0.45 $ 0.00  
- - - - - 
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You have successfully transferred the money!
 
Before completing the HIT, please answer the following five questions.
 
 
1. What is your gender?
 
2. What is your age?
 
3. What is your approximate annual income? 
 
4. Where did you grow up?
(e.g. Springfield Township, Union County, New Jersey) 
 
5. How much money do you expect to receive from Player 1? 
(e.g. $0.00; $1.50)
 $  
 
- - - - - 
That was the end of the game!
 
To complete the HIT and ensure it will be accepted please enter your mystery word
below in the box on the Mechanical Turk tab before submitting.
 
Your mystery word is:
 ONE
 
Thank you for completing the game!
 
Have you copied your mystery word?!
Then tick 'EXIT' to leave the game.
EXIT  
- - - - - 
Thank you for taking our survey. 
- - - - - - - - - - 
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